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ABSTRACT
This thesis seeks to provide an overview and examination of the thought of
the significant contemporary sociologist, Peter L. Berger. Berger is
concerned with the issue of how meaning is constructed in modern, secular,

bureaucratic society. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to outline, and trace
the development of, Berger's thought. To achieve this the thesis examines
Berger's use of the disciplines of the sociology of knowledge and religion,
along with contemporary studies in religion and theology.

Berger, by linking the function of a theodicy with that of making meaning,
allows for theodicies to be conceived of in the broader context of making
meaning in contemporary society. As such, a contemporary theodicy needs
to include (indeed, it needs to be inclusive, rather than exclusive) such
factors as the relationship between self, others, the world, and the
transcendent so as to provide some basis for an authentic and meaningful
existence. There is a need for a more inclusive theodicy (other than the
traditional individualistic type) which has hermeneutic concern for the
'whole' (wholeness of self, wholeness in relationships with others, wholeness

with the world/environment, and wholeness with the transcendent).
However, this 'wholeness' will not be provided by over-arching, public,
structures or systems; it will need to be through chosen, private means
which reflect the Post-Modernist situation where 'closure' on a grand scale

is unobtainable (Marshall, 1992, pp. 192 -193). Berger's work provides the
possibility for this legitimation of a theodicy (or theodicies) which will
provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment society.

The construction of meaning in contemporary society neells an ability to
i)
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cope with complexity, it needs to be reasonable, as well as contemporary (to
cope with the plurality in modern society), and it is on the way (that is, not
given to closure). Therefore any contemporary theodicy, or system of
meaning, must be able to be historically concerned (that is, conscious of its
origins and open to the future), empirical (that is, open to scrutiny and
review), inductive (that is, dealing with concrete reality, not abstract
theory), and concerned with people's lived experience. Berger's signals of
transcendence allow for the legitimation of this private, deinstitutionalized
religion; that is, they legitimate a meaningful theodicy for contemporary
humanity. This theodicy, which is able to accommodate the wider view
current in modern society provided by the ecological movement, interaction
between the various religious traditions, the feminist movement, the reality
of multi-culturalism, and the resulting pluralism from the above factors,

can provide some basis for a meaningful and authentic existence in
contemporary society. The signals of transcendence are able to correlate
people's lived experience (their 'natural reality') to a reality which is "in, with
and under" that natural reality (Berger, 1992, p. 155).
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CHAPI'ER I: INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a description and outline of the thought of the significant
contemporary sociologist, Peter L. Berger. Berger is concerned with the
issue of how meaning is constructed in modern, secular, bureaucratic
society. This thesis seeks to outline, and trace the development of, Berger's
thought.

Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil (1984, p. 22) suggest that
Berger displays a deep "concern with the problems of meaning in a culture
being transformed by the seemingly inexorable forces of modernization."
Indeed, Berger claims that "Men are congenitally compelled to impose a
meaningful order upon reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 22). The construction of
meaning is one of the primary requirements of each individual and of society
as a whole. "Ifwe hope to live not just from moment to moment, but in true
consciousness of our existence, then our greatest need and most difficult

achievement is to find meaning in our lives." (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 3).
Modern, industrialized society has undergone many significant changes
which affect the ability of the individual to construct meaning because the
means by which society inculcated meaning in traditional societies have
either gone or have been altered considerably (Beckford, 1989, p. 169).

Berger contends that due to the influences of secularization (Berger, 1967,
p. 107) and, more importantly, pluralism (Berger, 1967, pp. 135 - 137),
members of contemporary Western society are forced to choose between
competing systems of meaning (Berger, 1963, p. 68), and that because of
this necessity to choose meaning is able to be constructed (Berger, 1992,

pp. 87 - 89).

8

Berger's analysis of the contemporary situation involves a thorough
overview of many thinkers and intellectual movements. To achieve this
Berger attempts to address this contemporary situation by analyzing "the
essential elements of the whole. It is not clear whether the few who attempt
[this] ... are wise or foolish. Certainly some do a more convincing job than
others. Berger as a generalist is plainly one of those whose performance is
brilliant. His undertaking has been ambitious and energetic in the sense
that he attempts to cover an immense span of intellectual territory."
(Wuthnow, in Wuthnow,Hunter,Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 71).

To highlight the 'immense span of intellectual territory' which Berger does

cover this thesis describes, and traces the development of, Berger's
thought. The thesis also seeks to outline and describe Berger's analysis of
contemporary society, particularly with reference to what aspects of
religious meaning are compatible with modernity (that is, Berger's signals of
transcendence; infra uide, pp. 74 • 88).

This description and tracing of the development of Berger's thought occurs
in the three main chapters of the thesis:

In Chapter Two ('The Background to Berger's Thought') the various
influences apparent upon Berger's thought are discussed (infra ui.de, pp. 16
• 31);

Chapter Three ('Review of Berger's Works on Religion and the Construction
of Meaning'), along with Chapter Four, forms the heart of the thesis, and
discusses Berger's four central literary works (infra uide, pp. 32 · 88); and

9

Chapter Four provides 'An Examination of the Central Themes in Berger's

Work?(infravide, pp. 89 -116).
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Qm;mization of the Thesis:

The Abstract provides a brief discussion of the purpose of the thesis.

Chapter One provides an Introduction to the thesis which also includes an
overview of the Organization of the Thesis, the Statement of the Problem,
and discussion of the Methodology used in the thesis.

Chapter Two presents a discussion on The Background to Berger's
Thought, and attempts to demonstrete the various influences apparent
upon Berger's thought.

Chapter Three consists of the Review of Berger's Works on Religion and the
Construction of Meaning, and is particularly concerned with the four central
works of Berger in so far as these works provide the main corpus of Berger's
enormous output. The discussion here develops the main themes in Berger's
work, and also highlights the influences apparent upon Berger's work as
outlined in Chapter Two. This chapter, along with Chapter Four, forms the
heart of the thesis.

Chapter Four provides An Examination of the Central Themes in Berger's
Work, and is an attempt to examine and outline four core areas of Berger's

work which may be identified from Chapter Three; namely: Berger's
methodology; Berger's discussion of secularization and pluralism; Berger's
ethical and political position; and Berger's discussion of religious meaning
and modernity.

Chapter Five provides a Conclusion to the thesis. It seeks to offer some
11

general discussion on Berger's work.

Toe Glossary provides definitions and some discussion of the central ideas,
movements, and characters refe1Ted to in the thesis.

The Bibliography lists the central works of Berger referred to in the thesis,
and also lists works which provide discussion on the issues dealt with in the
thesis.
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Statement of the Problem:

Contemporary Western society has undergone !Ilany changes to the way it
is ordered and how people live witlrin that society over the past fifty to one
hundred years. Beckford (1989, p. 169) details many of these changes
which Berger, through bis sociological analysis of contemporary society,
distils to two essential changes or influences; these being: secularization
(Berger, 1967, p. 107) and pluralism (Berger, 1967, pp. 135 - 137).

Given these changes in contemporary society the ways in which meaning
is, or the ways in which theodicies are, constructed has changed too. Berger
links the function oftheodicies in contemporary society with that of making
meaning. Therefore, in spite of the collapse of traditional theodicies Berger
maintains that religion still has a place to play in human culture. This
thesis describes and outlines the ways in which Berger explores what
aspects of religious meaning are compatihle with modernity. This is the
problem oflegitimating a theodicy in Post-Enlightenment society.

This examination of the ways in which Berger explores what aspects of
religious meaning are compatible with modernity is achieved by describing,
and tracing the development of, Berger's thought.

13

Methodology:

Peter Berger has, over the course of more than thirty years, written an
enormous amount of material. Some of the themes which he developed
early on in his writings have remained influential throughout the course of
his (ongoing) career, whereas other themes which Berger set forth in !ris
writings early on in his career he either modified, adapted, or changed
altogether in his later writings. Therefore, this thesis is essentially a
description and outline of Berger's thought and work. The thesis also traces
the development of Berger's thought and work. The thesis is descriptive in
that the description, outline, and tracing of the development of Berger's
thought and work is reliant upon the evidence offered in Berger's main
literary works (so that Chapter Three, dealing as it does with Berger's four
main literary works, along with Chapter Four, forms the heart of the
thesis). The thesis examines Berger's use of the disciplines of the sociology
of knowledge =d religfon, along with contemporary studies in religion and
theology.

Berger smploys a phenomenological, empirical, and descriptive methodology
and, as such, the methodology of this thesis is similar to, and dependent
npon, Berger's methodology. Berger is vitally concerned with the lived
experience of humanity. His work is phenomenological and empirical "in the
sense that it is concerned with human experience in everyday life. Its task
is (most generally) to describe human experience as it is lived and not as it
is theorized about - to acc'<Junt for social reality from the point of view of the

act.ors involved." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil,
1984, p. 73).
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For Berger, as a sociologist and a Christian, the choice of this methodology
has taken the form of a 'vocation,' (Berger, 1992, p. 190) in so far as he
achieves a congruency between his life, his profession, and the methodology
which he employs within that profession.

15
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CHAPTERil:THE BACKGROUND TO BERGER'S THOUGHT

Peter Berger was born in Vienna between World War I ami World War IT in
the year 1929. His birth at this period of world history, witnessing in
particular the phenomenon of Nazism and the response of the church in
Germany to Hitler's political regime, seems to have bad a profound
influence upon Berger. The religious convictions held by Berger as a result
of his location at this point in history were profoundly influenced by N eo·
Orthodox Christianity.

The person at the centre of the Nao-Orthodox movement was Karl Barth
(1886 • 1968). Barth read Kierkegaard, along with the Bible and Luther and
Calvin, and crune to believe that God was on a completely different plane
from human thought; that there is an 'infinite qualitative distinction'
between humanity and God. This 'distinction' is nowhere more evident than
in the wars which had so ravaged the world. Barth maintained that all the
efforts humanity makes to reach God lead nowhere. Humans have to
acknowledge that they have no strength in themselves, and then they will
be able to hear what God is saying to them. In 1918 Barth produced the
first version of his Commentary on Romans, in wh'.ch he showed how Paul
'

had heard something of God's Word, and, although his own unden.--tanding
and his words were totally inadequate, because he and his thought forms
were captive to his own particular situation, yet, fur all that, the letter did
speak the Word of God, bringing a communication from the Wholly Other,
the Transcendent God (therefore Neo-Orthodox Christianity was also
known as'theologyofthe Word').

Barth believed it was impossible to find any adequate theological categories,
16
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but yet affirmed that it was essential to preach the gospel. He ref ised to
claim any superiority in human terms for Jesus or for Christianity, but
claimed very strongly that it was here that God chose to be revealed. Many
of his followers thought this meant that he was calling them to a faith
expressed in Existentialist terms, but this, too, he rejected, as just replacing
one philosophical framework with another. For the rest of his life he was
trying to work out in his Chw·ch Dogmatics how hwnanity can understand
what God has reveruc~, while rejecting all of humanity's efforts to reach up
and understand God alone and apart from God's revelation.

In his early days Barth tended to denigrate humanity, because so much

trust had been placed in human powers. But once it was clear that in his
teaching all power and grace came from God he was ready to point strongly

to th.a Incarnation, to the fact that the Word of God took humanity upon
Himself, to show the value that God gave to the hwnan. Barth never set
limits on God's grace, believing in the possibility of salvation for all, but also
acknowledging the terrible power of evil which stands in the way of that
hope. For central to his theology is God's judgement, that 'krisis' under
which humanity falls whenever it tries to work out its destiny in its own
strength (therefore, Neo-Orthodox Christianity was also known as 'theology
of crisis'). Every human being and every human institution, even, or

perhaps especially, the church, always stands under this judgement, which
is why it is called the theology of crisis (crisis, in the sense of judgement or
choice). It is also called dialectical theology, not in the Hegelian sense of
moving from thesis through antithesis to synthesis, but because there is
always both a yes and a no said to every theological statement. No human
language can contain God's truth, so that, for example, if we say that God
was revealed in Jesus Christ, we must also say that God was hidden there
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because of the limitations of Jesus' humanity.

In the 1930's many German theologians and the vast majority of
Protestant Christians saw Hitl~r as the hope of the nation, and, following
the pattern of Christendom, adapted the life of the church to the changing
patterns of Germany. Barth and a group of others rejected this line, formed
themselves into the Confessing Church, and formulated the Barmen
Decla,ation in 1934. The Confessing Church stood against Nazism because
it saw it as being blasphemous. It claimed to contain the whole truth,
leaving no place for God's "No." This provided the test case fo,; much
theology, and led to a creative reassessment of the role of the church over
against the world and its patterns of thought.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906 • 45) was deeply involved in the Confessing
Church, and decided to return to Germany from the U.S.A when war came
so that he could stand with his people against Nazism. Imprisoned in 1943
for his part in the plot against Hitler he continued his theological work,
showing immense creativity. He was particularly concerned to work out the
implicatious of the end of that Christendom situation in which most of the
problems had been tackled in a theological framework, and in which religion
was primarily seen as a search for personal salvation. He believed we need
to find what he called a "religionless Christianity," that is, in these terms, a

Christianity that is lived in the world and focuses on obedience to God,
rather than a religion which is a search for personal salvation. The language
of "religionless Christianity" became common ir, some quarters, often with
a meaning very different from Bonhoeffer's. But large sections of the church
have taken seriously his intention, which was part of the growing stress on
the Incarnation as a real Incarnation, in. which the humanity of Jesus is
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taken as seriously as His divinity (a theology from 'below' as opposed to
'above'). Bonhoeffer offers "a kind of theological counterpart to Freud's
criticism of immature religion, for the special religious corner is needed only
by those who have not become adult in their faith. Understood in this way,
Bonhoeffer's critique of religion is entirely acceptable." (Macquarrie, 1977,
pp.157 - 8).

Thus in his three years' work at his gthics, Bonhoeffer begau with
the idea of the amplitude of Christ's lordship; then that of conformity
with Christ became central; thirdly, he brought the world as

penultimate under justification; and finally, he reasoned from
incarnation to historical responsibility. Each line of approach
deepened the two aspects - a more resolute Christ-centredness, and
a more realistic openness to the world. (Bethge, 1967, p.625).

These two aspects - Christ-centredness and openness to the world - are
central to an understanding of Bonhoeffer's theology. This is most clearly
stated in the section of his Ethics entitled "Thinking in Terms of Two
Spheres." Here Bonhoeffer says that

Since the beginnings of Christiun ethics after the times of the New
Testament the main underlying conception in ethical thought, 8lld
the one which consciously or unconsciously has determined its whole
course, has been the conception of a juxtaposition and conflict of two
spheres, the one divine, holy, supernatural, and Christian, and the
other worldly, profane, natural, and un-Christian. .. It may be difficult
to break the spell of this thinking in terms of two spheres, but it is
nevertheless quite certain that it is in profound contradiction to the
19

thought of the Bible and to the thought of the Reformation, and that
consequently it aims wide of reality. There are not two ,ealities, but
only one reality, and that is the reality of God, which has become
manifest in Christ in the reality of the world... Ther1; are, therefore,
not two spheres, but only one sphere of the realization of Christ, in
which the reality of God and the reality of the world are united.
(Bonhoeffer, 1963, pp. 196 - 7).

Christianity is indeed rooted in and concerned with the ultimate; but before
the ultimate comes the penultimate, before the last things comes the next

to last things, and these are the every day social and ethical concerns of
humanity.

Reality is no longer devalued (as by idealists) or revalued (as by
positivists). 'To be in Christ' means to share in the world. Good,
therefore, is not an abstraction but a process, movement, constantly

accepting the world and people and taking part in their life; and so
ethics is helping people 'to share in life,' it is the Christlike in the
midst of the human. Christ sets up no foreign rule: the
'commandment of Jesus Christ... sets creation free for the fulfilment
of the law which is its own.' Christ 'eads, not beyond, but right into
the reality of everyday life. Christian life is no end in itself, but puts
one in a position to live as a man before God, not to become a
superman, buttoexist'forothermen.'(Bethge, 1967, p. 624).

This is, perhaps, the reason why Bonhoeffer will best be remembered. That,
above all else, he was a man for others. Bonhoeffer's charismatic appeal
explains, in some way, the influence which he had upon the development of
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post-war theology. Bonhoetfer had a concern to work out the implications of
the place of Christianity in the context of humanity having "come of age."
The place of theology within this context led to the clevelopment of'secular'
theologies to somehow reconcile the Christian faith with the influence of
secularization and modernity. These secular theologies led, in turn, to the
notorious 'death of God' theologies on the one hand and also to the various
'liberation' theologies on the other. The development of these various
theologies can be seen as reactions to the influence of secularization,
modernity and the continuing phenomenon of totalitarian regimes ofth., left;
and of the right around the world (Berger, 1969, pp. 11 · 13).

These influences of secularization, modernity and totalitarian regimes (or,
in a broader sense, the relationship between church and politics) which
provided the source of much which Nao-Orthodox theologians wrote about
are also strong influences upon the writings of Peter L. Berger. In his early
book The Precarious Vision (1961 b), which was influenced (even if
unconsciously) by Neo-Orthodox understandings, Berger drew a distinction
between "religion" and "Christian Faith." Berger later revoked this position,
writing in The Sacred Canopy (1967, pp. 179 · 185) that this distinction

was an artificial one based upon methodological fallacies. Berger's later
concern, which was hinted at in Appendix II of The Sacred Canopy
(Sociological and Theological Perspectiues, pp. 179 - 185), to confront the

historical relativity of religion and to take seriously the concept of religion
being a human product or projection and then to search for "discuveries" (as

opposed to "revelations") within these projections for what he termed
"signals of transcendence" became a reality with the publication of A
fumour of Angels (1969 ).

21

As mentioned above the influence ofNeo-Orthodoxy on Berger's work, both

in a positive affirmation and in a negative refutal, is evident in his published
works. This, and other influences, may be traced through the corpus of
Berger's work like the themes of a fugue ore woven together into a work of
musical composition. Sometimes one aspect of the theme is dominant, then
another. So with Berger's work there are themes, such as Neo-Orthodoxy,
which appear early on, but then are re-worked into other forms and then
appear again to complement the 'composition' in its entirety. It is only by
viewing the corpus as a whole, and how themes have developed over time in
Berger's writings, that a sense of the art of Berger's work becomes

apparent.

Another theme which Berger skilfully weaves into his writings includes a
deep commitment to preserving the dignity and worth of humanity. Berger's
humanistic concern (Berger, 1963, pp. 186 - 199) is grounded in a

.

Kantian/phenomenological epistemology. Kant (1724 - 1804) drew a
distinction between 'Phenomena' (that which can be perceived) and
'Noumena' (that which is beyond perception; "things in themselves").

Berger's concern, which stems from the intellectual environment of
rationalism and scepticism inherited from the distinction made by Kant,
dovetails neatly with the method of inquiry which he employs in his
sociological investigations. Berger's methodology is empirical in that it deals
with the lived experience of people (itis a pre-theoretical, inductive, 'bottomup' approach). Berger is eclectic in his sources and does not let
'methodological purity' become an obstacle to addressing what actually 'is.'
Berger's sociological concern (which is coloured, as mentioned above, by his
theological concern; particnlarly as influenced by Bonhoeffer) is to create a
tolerant and even compassionate society (Berger, 1963, pp. 183 ·· 185). This
22

concern for humanity led Berger to become interested in such political
concerns as Third World development and modernization (Berger, 1969, pp.
x • xi). Here again it is possible to detect the influence of Bonhoelfer upon
Berger as issues of religion in contemporary society impinge upon political
concerns. That is, to borrow from Bonhoeffer's terminology, whilst beinig
concerned with 'ultimate' reality, Berger is compelled to address issues of
'penultimate' reality for this is the reality of everyday life.

Another influence upon Berger, particularly in his earlier works, is that of
Existentialism (Berger, 1963, pp. 159 • 183). From Existentialism Berger
gains a perspective on religion that requires of religion that it possess an
ability to cope with complexity, that it is reasonable, as well as
contemporary, that it is comprehensive and can cope with plurality, and
that it is 'on the way' and in dialogue with, and cognizant of, the modern
world as opposed to being fixed, absolutist, triumphalistic, and immutable
(again, Berger is more concerned with "discoveries" as opposed to fixed

"revelations"). Furthermore, Berger's humanistic concern and the influence
of Existentialism compel him to adopt a methodology which is historically
concerned, empirical, inductive, and concerned with lived experience. Above
all else the Existentialist concern for authenticity further compels Berger to
address issues of'proto-typical' concern, that is the issues of everyday li,red
existence, so that the existent may make choices which do not lead to 'bad
faith,' but bring personal (and social) freedom.

Phenomenology provides a significant methodological tool for Berger. Berger
,' adopts (11nd adapts) this methodology from the sociologist Alfred Schutz
(1899 - 1959) who was concerned to explore the 'world-taken-for-granted.'
This is the self evident world of the 'here-and-now' which demands ones
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immediate attention. Phenomenology, as employed by Berger, requires the
'bracketing' of personal preferences and prejudices so as to be able to
investigate the "doings of men." (Berger, 1963, p. 29). Phenomenology refers
to the 'study of phenomena;' the study of what appears or what may be
observed (similar to Kant's 'Phenomena;' infra vide, p. 26). The use of
phenomenology requires that the investigator utilizes academic discipline
and imaginative empathy. This requires the investigator to make an
attempt to appropriate and und11rstand what a particular phenomenon
might involve for those people who are directly engaged with it.
Phenomenology is a kind of thinking which guides the investigator back
from theoretical abstraction to the reality of the lived experience. A
phenomenologist asks the question "what is it like to have a certain
experience?" In examining the qualities of the experience the investigator
can then arrive at the essence of the experience. The phenomenological

method is an inductive, descriptive research method. The task of the
method is to investigate and describe all phenomena, including the human
experience, in the way these phenomena appear in their fullest breadth and
depth. To ensure that the phenomenon is investigated as it truly appears a
necessary criterion is that the researcher must approach the subject and
the experienr;e with an open mind, accepting whatever data are given with

no pre-conceived e"P"ctations. No data are ignored because of conflicts with
theoretical frameworks or operational definitions. The concern of the
phenomenological researcher is to understand both the cognitive subjective
perspective of the person who bas the experience and the effect that
perspective has on the lived experience of that individual. (Kentish, 1992,
pp. 42 • 48).

Given Berger's Existential/phenomenological methodology he is,
24

nonetheless, also concerned with society too, and therefore his work is of
hermeneutic significance in that he draws (implicitly, at least) on the notion
of'Verstehen' (Berger, 1963, p. 146). Verstehen implies an understanding
by one of the 'other.' Verstehen, like phenomenology, seeks to understand
the meaning of an other's actions. Actions in themselves may prove

ambiguous to an observer; unless the observer gains understanding of the
meaning of an action then the observer is unable to fully appreciate the
'other' (person or society).

Berger (and Thomas Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality:)
combines phenomenology along with the sociology of knowledge in his two
most influential works: The Social Construction of Reality (1966) and The
Sacred Canopy (1967). The sociology of knowledge, derived as it is from the
work cf Max Scheler, may be summed up in the statement that "Reality is
socially constructed." (Berger, 1963, p. 136). Berger (and Luckmann)
develop this thesis concerning the social construction of reality in a broad,
all-encompassing way in The Social Construction of Reality, and then
Berger applies the same methodological tools to the study of religion in The
Sacred Canopy where Berger explores the historicity of religion given that
religion is a social (human) construction, and also the subsequent sociohistorical relativity of all religion.

The history of ideas provides Berger with an over-arching view of society
and the (changing) role of religion in contemporary society. These changes
in the way in which the world has been perceived include (following Roberts,
1980, pp. 810 - 819; and Berger, 1969, pp. 33 - 36): First; the change in
perspective as a result of Copernicus establishing that our universe has as
its centre the sun (that is, it is 'heliocentric') and that the earth (as opposed
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to the previously assumed position; for instance, by the use of such terms
as "sunrise" and "sunset") was not the centre of the universe, but just one

planet in just one galaxy set amongst innumerable other galaxies. Second;
Rene Descartes' (1596 • 1650) maxim "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think,
therefore I run") provided another shift in perspective from a theocentric
world to an anthropocentric one, where humanity stands at the centre.
Third; Kant's distinction between 'Phenomena' (that which can be
perceived) and 'Noumena' (that which is beyond perception; "things in
themselves") led to a reduction of religion to morality. For instance, Kant's
'Categorical Imperative' ("Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at
the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.") tends
towards an understanding of God where God becomes the condition for the
possibility of humanity's moral autonomy. This whole shift in view from the
Pre to the Post-Enlightenment is an enormous one. Though restricted to
intellectuals initially, it became widespread in the Nineteenth Century
through the means of the popular press and the new found power of the
lower and middle classes. The metaphysical certainties of the Mediaeval
world were gone (Jung, 1933, p. 204), <111d the process of secularization had
begun in earnest. Along with this shift in 'mind-set' came a shift in politics
too where the principles of'liberty, equality, and fraternity' heralded in the

secular, democratic state as a political given. Fourth; the Darwinian theses
of'Evolution' and 'Natural Selection' saw humanity's 'God-likeness' further
shattered as humanity came to be seen as another creature suluect to the
same physical and genetic laws as all other creatures, and indeed having
been derived from and owing its origin to other creatures. Fifth; along with
these other trends a growing historical consciousness of the development of
society, religion, and of ideas and philosophy emerged. The Judeo-Christian
tradition came to be seen as one amongst many, and the texts which had

26

largely legitimated this tradition came under close scrutiny which confirmed
their hist.orical evolution and cultural setting. Hence the authority of the
Bible and the church, and the traditional arguments for the existence of God
came to be increasingly questioned and rejected. As modern, secular
societies were developing under the influence of science, democracy,

nationalism, and economic individualism religion failed t.o provide a coherent
nomos (a coherent 'cement') given all these developments such as
industrialization, scientific discovery, and rapid social change. This gave rise
to the Romantic movement, and to the rise of English Literature which
came to fill the emotional and experiential needs of people; that is, it
provided a coherent nomos, a socially constructed reality relevant t.o the
age (Eagleton, 1986, pp. 22 -23). Sixth; these critical studies of history,
human r~ature, and culture gave rise to various 'Naturalistic' theories

regarding the place of religion in society such as those forwarded by
Fauerbach, Marx, and Freud. Feuerbach's 'projection' theory, and Marx's
'opiate' assertion provided a natural springboard for Freud's 'illusion'

hypothesis. What served most t.o popularize the psycho-analytic technique
were the revolutionary, yet widely popular (at least in academic circles),
naturalistic interpretations of existence and, in particular, religion. In both
Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of

an

Illusion Freud

maintained that religion has no empirical support, that it was an interim
social neurosis, providing security from the harshness of reality, and that it
had outlived its use, and that humanity would grow out of it through
education. As mentioned previously, this view of religion was not original t.o
Freud, as both Feuerbach and Marx both offered their own naturalistic
theories regarding the origin of religion. Finally; the sociology of knowledge
maintains that the very heart of the world that humans create is socially
constructed meaning (Berger, 1969, p. 33 ff.). Humans necessarily infus,,
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their own meaning int.o reality. The individual attaches subjective meaning
t.o all their actions. Given this social construction of reality Berger asserts
that

Religion thus serves to maintain the reality of that socially
constructed world within which men exist in their everyday lives. Its
legitimating power, however, has another important dimension· the

integration of a comprehensive nomos of precisely those marginal
situations in which everyday life is put in question. (Berger, 1967, p.
42).

These 'marginal situations' include: falling asleep/waking up and the

transition period between them; dreams; disease; acute emotional
disturbance; suffering; upheavals to the 'normal' order (for iI,stance, war,
and natural disast.er); and death. Beq,er goes on to say that

The implication of the rootage ofreligion in human activity is not
that religion is always a dependent variable in the history of society,
but rather that it derives its objective and subjective reality from
human beings, who produce and reproduce it in their ongoing lives.
(Berger, 1967, p. 48).

This takes place through the three-fold process of Externalization: which
involves the outpouring of human being into the world; Objectivation: where
the product of externalization confront.s it.s original producers as a facticity

external to and other than themselves; and Internalization: in which the
structures of the externaVobjective world are transformed int.o structures of
the subjective consciousness.
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Therefore

the point is that the same human activity that produces society
also produces religion, with the relation between the two products
always being a dialectical one. (Berger, 1967, p. 47).

This socio-historical consciousness (along with the other influences upon his
work) motivates Berger to enter into a dialogue with contemporary society.
As a result of this dialogue Berger developed the notion of 'signals of

transcendence.' These signals "point toward the reality beyond the
ordinary." (Berger, 1969, p. x). Berger outlined these signals of
transcendence in his book A Rumour of Angels (1969) which drew on, as its
inspiration, the theology of such Liberal Protestant theologians as
Schleiermacher who, in Berger's opinion, had the courage to use the tools of
the social sciences, which had previously been employed by those
antagonistic to the theological task, to construct an inductive theology.

In The Heretical Imperative, Berger argues that, in the modern era,

three different methodologies have been employed in an attempt to
understand religious truth. The first, he terms 'deduction.' It involves
reaffirmation of the authority of a religious tradition, in spite of the
difficulties of doing so in the context of modem pluralism and within
the assumptions of socio-historical relativism. An exemplar in the
use of this method would be Karl Barth. He labels the second method
'reduction' and considers the work of Rudolph Bultmann to fall into
this category. Here, the religious tradition is reinterpreted via
modern, secular categories in the hope of making aspects of the
tradition meaningful to the modernist mind. The last method,
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'induction,' involves an attempt to uncover and retrieve essential
experiences embodied in the religious tradition. It is both empirical
and comparative, in that it takes all religious experience seriously in
its search for transcendent reality. Friedrich Schleiermacher
achieves paradigmatic status relative to this approach. (Gaede, in
Hnnter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 170).

The various themes and influences appearing in Berger's works (such NeoOrthodoxy, Existentialism, phenomenology, the sociology of knowledge,
socio-historical relativism, and his ongoing dialogue with contemporary
society) enables him to achieve a synthesis of the Weberian and
Durkheimian approaches to sociology (Berger, 1963, pp. 145 - 150). Put
simply Durkheim's emphasis on the objective reality of society (which
tended towards a functionalistic and positivistic approach which was very
much in vogue in the United States of America when Berger began to
investigate the social construction of reality and led to an impasse within
the sociology of religion in that it dealt, on the whole, with such trivial issues
as church attendance by using quantitative survey methods and did not
explore the substantive issues raised by the socio-historical relativism of
re'lgion) tended towards "sociological reification" (Berger, 1967, p. 187);
whereas Weber's emphasis on the subjective reality of society tended
towards "an idealistic distortion of the societal phenomenon." (Berger, 1967,
p. 187). This synthesis achieved by Berger enabled him to address the
substantive issues raised by the sociology of knowledge with respect to the
socio-historical relativism of religion (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hnnter,
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 75 · 76). Whilst obviously being eclectic
in his sources Berger, nonetheless, achieves an original approach to the
sociology of religion in his attempt to 'transcendentalize secularity' (Berger,
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1969, p. x) in his affirmation of the various signals of transcendence.
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CHAPTERID:REVIEW OF BERGER'S WORKS ON
REUGION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING

This section seeks to outline and describe Berger's thought as evidenced in
his written works, and, together with Chapter Four, forms the heart of the
thesis. The discussion here develops the main themes in Berger's work, and
also highlights the influences apparent upon Berger's work as outlined in
Chapter Two. The examination of Berger's work is essentially chronological,
and will focus on his three seminal works: (i) The Social Construction of
Reality (with Thomas Luckmann) (1966); (ii) The Sacred Canopy (1967);
and (iii) A Rumour of Angels (1969). The overview of Berger's thought,
however, begins with an examination of Berger's popular introduction to the
study of sociology: Invitation to Sociology... A Humanistic Perspective
(1963). In this early work, Berger sets forth some of the themes which he

re-works and eXJ"lllds upon in his later works.

Berger's latest work: A Far Glory; The Quest for Faith in an Age of
Credulity (19s2) is not reviewed here; for it forms a central part of Chapter
Four ('An Examination of the Central Themes in Berger's Work'), in that it
highlights some of the ways in which Berger re-works and expands some of
the themes he deals with in the works reviewed in this chapter; and in that
it also highlights some developments in Berger's thought.
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INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY... A Hun.,anistic Perspective (1963):

Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil (1984, p. 22) suggest that
Berger displays a deep "concern with the problems of meaning in a culture
being transformed by the seemingly inexorable forces of modernization." In
this introduction (or invitation) to sociology Berger attempts to address the
issues surrounding the making of meaning in contemporary society (Berger,
1963, p. 68). This concern which Berger displays in this, and all his other
works, is largely motivated by his interest in religion (Berger, 1963, p. 8),
which Berger sees as being one of the significant humanizing forces in the
modern world (Berger, 1969, p. xiii). Berger's interest in the preservation of
the human element within contemporary society in no way implies that he
is 'soft' or theoretically unsound. Berger is one of the few academics who

seem to be able to find congruency between their life, their profession, and
the methodology employed within that profession. Berger is most familiar
with the sociology of religion, yet in this introductory book be attempts to
construct a schema for sociology as a whole. He begins by describing
sociology as an individual pastime (Berger, 1963, pp. 11 • 36), as a field of
inquiry with Existential implications, exhorting practitioners not to rely too
heavily on the 'tyranny of technique' (statistics, or obscure jargon), but to
bracket their preferences and prejudices (following phenomenology) in the
spirit of 'value-free' (after Weber) scientific inquiry so as to be able
investigate the "doings of men." (Berger, 1963, p. 29). Berger insists upon
the methodological stringency of value-free inquiry so that the practitioner
is able to be free to discover the unexpected and the different ways in which
social interaction is perceived by different sectors of society (Berger, 1963,
pp. 15, 28 ff.). This implies both the need for description, and the possibility
of prescription. Berger can be both conservative and radical at the self
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same time. Whilst seeing sociology as an individual pastime, Berger is
adamant of the need for au undP.rstanding of history to be part of the
sociological endeavour as well; for the descriptive role of the sociologist is, in
many ways, similar to the role of the historian (Berger, 1963, p. 32).

Berger then addresses the circumstances and historical setting in which
sociology as a discipline was formulated (Berger, 1963, pp. 37 - 67). Berger
claims that modern society emerged when "the normative structures of
Christendom and later of the ancien regime were collapsing." (Berger, 1963,
p. 42), and that the discipline of sociology developed in France after the
Revolution (1789) against the background of the rapid transformation in
society (Berger, 1963, p. 54). Whilst the attitude (the 'form of

consciousness') necessary for sociological inquiry no doubt existed in former
times, it would seem that sociology stems from a modern, PostEnlightenment world-view. The socio-historical consciousn,,.ss of the
relativity of ail world views, and the extent to which rapid transfonnations
take place within a society engenders an attitude of inquiry as to why
things are as they are and why they are not otherwise (Berger, 1963, p. 62).
The 'Classical' world-view held that fixed, immutable principles evidenced in
the world gave rise to eternal, unchanging principles. Whereas the
historically conscious world-view avoids this outlook of the classical worldview which held t,hat there is "an unchanging body of clearly formulated
precepts, based on a supposedly unchanging nature." (Macquarrie, 1977, p.
506). With the decline in influence of the classical world-view a more
sceptical and critical approach was taken to the investigation of such
institutions as government, religious authority, the family, and society as a
whole. Berger maintl!ins that sociology "is constituted by a peculiarly
modem form of consciousness." (Berger, 1963, p. 37). Geographical and
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social mobility meant that different world-views came into contact which
results in sociological relativization (Berger, 1963, p. 62). This ability to 'see
through things' (institutions, and the like) Berger terms 'debunking.' An
example of debunking which Berger cites is Weber's analysis of the
unintended outcomes of the Calvinist Reformation (The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism; Berger, 1963, pp. 51 -52). The capacity of
sociology to provide alternative ways of looking at what are held to be
norms is one of its great strengths accordine to Berger. Yet, along with this
ability to see through things Berger would have the sociologist be aware of
the need to maintain a broad and open mind on all aspects under inquiry so
that sociology might also contribute to an understanding of society which
enables people to be free and to live full human lives. For Berger there is a
direct link between cynicism and compassion. By seeing things as they are
one is freed from the naive belief in purely ideological statements. Berger
maintains that the ability to act freely is dependent upon being able to
perceive the ideological constraints of one's own world-view, and thereby

then being able to understand, if not appreciate, the world-view of'others.'
(Berger, 1963, pp. 130, 146, 183 - 185).

This ability to see clearly; to perceiYe society as it is, enables sociology (or,
more particularly, one who has sociological understanding or
'consciousness') to make choices between varying and sometimes
contradictory systems of meaning. That is, sociology (sociological
consciousness) enables meaning to be made in the complex, contemporary,
pluralistic situation of modern society (Berger, 1963, p 68). The social and
geographical mobility inherent in contemporary society leads to a worldview where there are no fixed points and no closure (Berger, 1963, p. 73).
This world-view is essentially a Post-Enlightenment one, and may even be
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considered to be a Post-Modem one. Modem society has moved from the
Pre-Enlightenment, to >,he Enlightenment, to the Post-Enlightenment
(modern), to the Post-Modern. The Post-Modern world-view is one which disconfirms ideology, particularly religious ideology (theodicy) in its traditional
form due to the secularization and pluralization of society. PostModernism's resistance to closure, rejection of absolute 'Truths,' empirical,

anti-transcendental, questioning of 'metanarratives' derives from the view

of the social construction of reality as provided by the sociology of
knowledge. Nonetheless this world-view still values local and contingent
truths. (Marshall, 1992, pp. 3 - 6, 18, 86, 157; Eagleton, 1986, pp. 22 - 23,
60, 107). Post-Modernism corresponds to Berger's notion of the 'public' and
the 'private' spheres. The public sphere is over-institutionalized (dealing as

it does with such 'social' concepts as 'sincerity' and 'honour'), whereas the
private sphere is under- (or de-) institutionalized (dealing as it does with
more personal concepts as 'authenticity' and 'dignity') (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 81). Value is still to be attributed to life; meaning is still
to be sought from life

(Marshall, 1992, p. 6); but the world-view

('Weltanschauung') deriving from the influence of the sociology of knowledge
is a sceptical one which is prepared to question authority and the
propaganda which those in power purport to be (the) 'Truth.' Berger
maintains that the sociology of knowledge enables one to view society with
clear sigl.t (Berger, 1963, pp. 79, 128 -140).

This scepticism is further required so that one is able to resist the definition
of oneself which society imposes (Berger, 1963, pp. 83 - 109). In other
words, society locates the individual (the world-taken-for-granted) through

various mechanisms such as social control (where violence, economic
constraints, ridicule, ostracism, popular social morality, and even one's
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occupation and family may be employed by society to define and locate the
individual within society) and social stratification (where the individual is
ranked within society, and whereby power, privilege, and prestige are given
to, or withheld from, the individual depending upon their particular social

stratification). This social stratification and social control locates o;
situates (the 'sitz im leben'... 'situation in life') the individual within society.
The various institutions within society such as family and occupation
provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned. This gives
to society a sense of objective reality :mch that, following Durkheim, society
may be deemed to be 'there.' Or, as Berger pnts it "society is the walls of our
imprisonment in history." (Berger, 1963, p. 109). The facticity, or
'thereness,' of society further strengthens the view afforded by the sociology
of knowledge that the 'world-taken-for-granted' is not the only way to
perceive things (given that other societies view things differently), and that,

because of this, scepticism is required so as to dis-believe (or to 'disconfirm') the way in which society locates the individual, and to be freed
from this limited view of self and of society (Berger, 1963, pp. 148 - 152).

Having explored the objective nature of society (after Durkheim) as the
'world-taken-for-granted' Berger tloen briefly overviews three methods of
analyzing society which help to provide a more subjective view of society
(after Weber). These three methodologies include: Role Theory which
maintains that "Identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained, and
socially transformed." (Berger, 1963, p. 116); the sociology of knowledge
which maintains that ideas as well as humanity are socially located, and
that reality is socially constructed. The sociology of knowledge is anti·
idealistic in its tendency, and tends to ask the question "Says who?"
(Berger, 1963, p. 129) of ideological assertions where a certain idea serves a
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vested interest in society. When such an idea serves such a function it

'legitimates' the social construction of reality, whereby the idea (ideology)
attempts to explain, justify, and even sanctify (or reify) that particular
social construction of reality. Religion may at times serve such a function
when, for instance, 'virtues' such as humility and respect for authority, or

patient suffering is extolled as a virtue in the face of unjust suffering, then
these 'virtues' provide a legitimation of the political authority, or as the
assuagement of social rebellion (what Weber terms the 'theodicy of
suffering'). The use of religion (or any ideology) like this is possible in so far
as the ideology which has been reified is then 'internalized' into the life of the
~eliever, where the world 'out there' becomes the world 'in here.' (Berger,

1963, p. 134). The third such methodology is Reference Group Theory which
maintains that a reference group "is the collectivity whose opinions,
convictions, and courses of action are decisive for the formation of our own
opinions, convictions, and courses of action. The reference group provides us

with a model with which we can continually compare ourselves." (Berger,
1963. p. 137). Of these three methodologies it is the sociology of lmowledge
which provides the greatest insight for Berger into the role and function of
society. Berger later uses the sociology of knowledge as the theoretical
hases for The Social Construction of Reality (1966) (co-authored with
Thomas Ludemann), and again in The Sacred Canopy (1967).

This tension between the objective reality of society, whereby society
defines who we are and what we do, and the subjective reality of society,
whereby we define society, means that society is, in fact, 'precarious.' That

is "Since all social systems were creat.ed by men, it follows that men can
also change them." (Berger, 1963, p. 149). This balance between social
reification (objective social reality) and idealism (subjective social meaning)
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allows for detachment from the world of original socialization and for the
construction of alternative worlds. That is, humans, so Berger maintains,
are free (Berger, 1963, pp. 149 - 171). This 'freedom' is unable to be proved
(or dis-proved either) by empirical means; yet freedom, nonetheless, is an
aspect of human existence and reality. Freedom is exercised daily through
choice ('authentic existence'), or denied through the flight from choice
('inauthentic existence'). Those who seek to be defined solely by the way in
which society defines them exercise 'bad faith' because they refuse to act
with individual responsibility. Obviously Berger makes use of the
Existentialists (Sartre in particular) when he explores the area of freedom.
For Berger freedom is an act of ecstasy; which for him means "stepping out,
alone, to face the dark." (Berger, 1963. p. 171).

Berger's methodology is eclectic in that it combines phenomenology(dealing
with what 'is'), the sociology of knowledge, humanism, and Existentialism.
In the spirit of'value-free' inquiry he brackets his Neo-Orthodox Christian

beliefs, yet is still quite concerned with values, ethics, and morality (Berger,
1963, pp. 188 - 199).

The sociology of knowledge provides a clear sighted view of society by
suggesting that all categories invested with 'ontological' significance are

arbitrary, incomplete, and, most importantly, reversible. Therefore there is

a need to take all socially assigned identities with a grain of salt, including
one's own. Having this perspective, or understanding ('Verstehen'), of
society allows for the place of compassion within society in that the
individual is the.'1 able to recognize the freedom of the 'other.' (Berger, 1963,
pp. 183 • 184).
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It is this humanistic concern and understanding which, for Berger, provides
the ultimate reason. for the continued pursuit of sociology as an academic
discipline in the liberal tradition. "Unlike the puppets, we have the
possibility of stopping in our movements, looking up and perceiving the
machinery by which we have been moved. In this lies the first step towards
freedom. And in this same act we find the conclusive justification of
sociology as a humanistic discipline." (Berger, 1963, p. 199).
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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY... A Treatise in the
~ociology of Knowledge (with Thomas Luckmann) (1966):
Berger and Luckmann begin this wol'k with a socio-historical overview of
those people and those ideas which provide the theoretical substance and
methodological justification for their endeavours in and with the sociology of
knowledge. Indeed, "The present volume is intended as a systematic,
theoretical treatise in the sociology of knowledge." (Berger and Luckmann,
1966, p. v). To achieve this end Berger and Luckmann choose in an eclectic
manner from those people and those ideas which they review so as to
achieve a unique analysis of the sociology of knowledge and its concerns.
Put simply, Berger and Luckmann contend that "the socwwgy ofknowledge
is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality." (Berger

and Luckmann, 1966, p. 3).

As with Berger's discussion of freedom in Invitation to Sociology (1963) here

Berger and Luckm.ann insist on the every day, commonsense, usage of such

terms as 'reality'· "a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize
as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot 'wish them

away')." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 1); and 'knowledge'· "the certainty
that phenomena are real and that they posses specific characteristics."

(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 1). Therefore, "The need for a 'sociology of
knowledge' is thus already given with the observable differences between
societies in terms of what is taken for granted as 'knowledge' in them."
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 3).

Wbilst the term 'Sociology of Knowledge' ('Wissenssoziologie') was coined by
the philosopher Max Scheler in the 1920's, Berger and Luckmann suggest
three other contributing factors in the development of the sociology of
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knowledge. First is the work of Karl Marx from whom the sociology of
knowledge derives its root proposition "that man's consciousness is

determined by his social being." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 5). From
Marx comes also such concepts as: ~deology' - "ideas serving as weapons for

social interests."; 'false consciousness' - "thought that is alienated from the
real social being of the thinker."; 'substructure' - "human activity."; and
'superstructure' - "the world produced by that activity." (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 6). Second, "one can say that the sociology of
knowledge represents a specific application of what Nietzsche aptly called
the 'art of mistrust.= (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7). The third factor
Berger and Luckmann cite as being influential in the development of the
sociology of knowledge is the development of historicism in which the
"dominant theme here was an overarching sense of the relativity of all
perspectives on human events, that is, of the inevitable historicity of
human thought." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7).

This socio-historical relativistic world-view (or consciousness) is a Post-

Enlightenment one held mainly in Western societies largely because the
factors leading to this secularized and rationalistic world-view are
essentially Western in nature (factors such as: industrialization,

technological development, the growth of complex economies and the
prevalence of economic rationalism as the driving force of such economies,

the need these economies have for highly trained personnel, and the
development of highly organized, bureaucratic management structures).
Given this mix of factors Western society has become secularized,

rationalistic (in its economic processes), pluralistic, and modern (as opposed
to 'traditional'). The insidious creeping of this economic model into the socalled 'Third World' or 'Developing' economies (through the activities of the
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World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) will probably see a
similar process occur within those societies and economies which become

more highly industrialized and whose economies become more closely linked
to the 'world economy.'

There is a parallel in the overall intention of Scheler's work and that of
Berger (and Luckmann) in that Scheler sought "to throw a sizable sop to
the dragon of relativity, but only so as to enter the castle of ontological
certitude better." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 8). This intention, which
Berger shares, is outlined by Berger in the Introduction to the 1990 edition
of A Rumour of Angels (pp. ix - x) where he refers to his project of
"relativizing the relativizers." This project (like Scheler's), of which The
Social Construction of Reality is a part, involves showing "how the

intellectual tools of the social sciences, which had contributed greatly to the
loss of credibility of religion, could be turned on the very ideas that had
discredited supernatural views of the world and on the people propagating
those ideas." (Berger, 1969 [1990 edition], pp. ix- x).

Whilst Berger's (and Luckmann's) concern in The Social Construction of
Reality is essentially theoretical this theorizing is, however, related to the
everyday, concrete concerns of humanity. Berger and Luckmann base the
content of SECTION I ('The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life') of
their book on the work of the sociologist (and Berger's teacher) Alfred
Schutz. Schutz "concentrated on the structure of the commonsense world

of everyday life." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 16). Therefore, "The
socwlogy of krwwledge must concern itself with everything that passes fbr
'knowledge' in society." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 14, 15). Berger and

Luckmann explore the concepts of 'reality' and 'knowledge' as they are
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taken in a commonsense way by "ordinary members of society." (Berger
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 19). This task is essentially a descriptive one,
relying as it does on "The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or
rather the subjective experience of everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann,
1966, p. 20). This analysis "refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses,
as well as assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena
analyzed." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 20). As part of this analysis
Berger and Luckmann seek to schematize the reality of everyday life; this
is, in part, their contribution to the theory of the sociology of knowledge.

Within the world-taken-for-granted of everyday reality there are, in fact,
multiple realities such as the transition between sleep and wakefulness.
Berger (1967, pp. 22 - 23) later refers to these periods of transition as
'marginal situations.' One may even be "transported to another world"
through play (theatre or art or music or even religion and ritual; Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 25), or one may be required to use a different language
as opposed to the everyday language when one tries "to report about
theoretical, aesthetic or religious worlds of meaning." (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 26). Berger (1969, p. 59 ff.) later refers to these
phenomena as 'signals of transcendence.' These 'marginal situations' and
'signals of transcendence' form a central part in Berger's attempt to

'relativize the relativizers' (1969 [1990 edition], pp. ix- x). However, reality,
in the normal. course of everyday reality, is objectivated. That is, reality has

about it a givenness, which is paramount, and self-evident, and which is
shared with others. Therefore, "there is an ongoing correspondence between
my

meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common

sense about its reality." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 23).
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Ainlay (in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 43 • 46) summarizes Berger and
Luckmann's foundations of knowledge in everyday life as: everyday reality
is paramount; primacy is on the 'here and now;' the 'here and now' is usually

defined in terms of standard time and space; everyday reality tends to be a
highly pragmatic world; everyday ~eality demands our 'wide·awakeness,'
that is, our full attention; we 'willingly suspend doubt' in everyday reality;
and we compartmentalize everyday reality.

An example of the objectivation which occurs in everyday reality is

language. Language makes real, or proclaims, the subjective interiority of
the one speaking. That language can be understood signifies the shared sign
system of those who speak or understand that language; that is, those who
share the everyday reality of the subject. However, within a language
system other factors other than everyday (objective) reality manifest
themselves. These factors, such as religmn, require a special language (and
also a special understanding), as they seek to objectify very subjective
experiences. Therefore, "language is pliantly expansive so as to allow me to
objectify a great variety of experiences coming my way in the course of my
life.• (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 39).

This objectivation available through language is a fundamental aspect of
humanity's relationship to the external world. For "Unlike the other higher
mammals, he has no species-specific environment... man's relationship to

his environment is characterized by world-openness." (Berger and

Luckmann, 1966, p. 47). This 'world-openness' requires of the human
organism an "immense plasticity in its response to the environmental

forces at work on it." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 48). Berger and
Luckmann suggest that this plasticity is an inherent aspect of what it is to
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be human for "While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more
significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that
man produces himself." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 49). This 'selfproduction' leads to the production of an ordered, social world; for, as
mentioned previously (supra vide, p. 44), Berger and Lucl,mann contend
that there is a 'correspondence' between self and others in the process of

the social construction of reality. Humanity, so Berger and Lucl!cmann
contend, seeks always to create a stable external environment in the face
of the 'plasticity' o.nd 'world-openness' of human nature which requires that
humanity externalizes itself in such a way which leads to order and
eventuates in institutionalization. (Berger and Lucl<mann, 1966, p. 52).

It is here, at this point, when the collective externalization of humanity,
which leads to institutionalization, that the objective reality of society
takes on a givenness which becomes the world-taken-for-granted. For "All
human activity is subject to habitualization." (Berger and Luclrmann,
1966, p. 53). Institutions, with the givenness that they create, occur
"whenever there is a reciprocal typification ofhabitualized actions by types
of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution." (Berger
and Lucltmann, 1966, p. 54). As an institution's givenness becomes tal<enfor-granted it assumes a historicity and control of its own. (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 54). As externalization leads to institutionalization, so
habitualization leads to objectivation. "The process by which the
externalized products of human activity attain a character of objectivity is
objectivation." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 00). These two 'moments'
(externalization and ohjectivation) are part of a three-fold dialectic that is
at the heart of Berger and Luckmann's thesis concerning the social
construction of reality; the clrird 'moment' being 'internalization.' Berger and
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Luckmann maintain that esch of these dialectical 'moments' correspond to
an essential aspect of the social world:

Externalization

- "Society is a human product."

Objectivation

- 'Society is an objective reality."

Internalization

- "Man

is

a social product." (Berger and

Luckmann, 1966, p. 61).

~/he institutional, social world requires legitimation so as to explain and
justify itself to subsequent generations, or to newcomers to that society.
This process occurs through socialization (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.
61). A 'canopy' of legitimations surround the institutional order of society
"stretching over it a protective cover of both cognitive and normative
interpretation." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 62). Furthermore, these
legitimations tend to be pre-theoretical in nature precisely because they
deal with the shared reality of the commonsense, world-taken-for-granted
knowledge of society. This pre-theoretical knowledge incorporates "the sum
total of 'what everybody knows' about a social world, an assemblage of
maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths,

and so forth." (Berger and Luck.mann, 1966, p. 65).

This is the knowledge that is learned in the course of socialization
and that mediates the internalization within individual consciousness
of the objectivated structures of the social world. Knowledge, in this
sense, is at the heart of the fundamental dialectic of society. It
"programs" the channels in which externalization produces an
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objective world. It objectifies this world through language and the
cognitive apparatus based on language, that is, it orders it into
oqiects to be apprehended as reality. It is internalized again as
objectively valid truth in the course of socialization. Knowledge about
society is thus a realization in the double sense of the word, in the
sense of apprehending the ol6ectivated social reality, and in the
sense of ongoingly producing this reality. (Berger and Luckmann,

1966, p. 66).

In the section of The Social Construction of Reality dealing with 'Society As

Objective Reality' (following Durkheim), Berger and Lucl,mann describe
society and institutionalization in such a way so as to mal<e them seem
fixed and immutable in their nature and in the way they are manifested

within the world-taken-for-granted. "Institutionalization is not, however, an
irreversible process, despite the fact that institutions, once formed, have a

tendency to persist. For a variety of historical reasons, the scope of

institutionalized actions may diminish; deinstitutionalization may take
place in certain areas of social life. For example, the private sphere that
has emerged in modern industrial society is considerablydeinstitutionalized
as compared to the public sphere." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 81).
The emergence of this private sphere in modern industrialized societies
swms, in large part, to be due primarily to the extent that that society

moves from a traditional economic system (be it either agrarian,
subsistence, or hunting and gathering) to an economy which enables the
production of an economfo surplus. "In advanced industrial societies with

their immense economic surplus allowing large numbers of individuals to
devote themselves to even the obscurest pursuits, pluralistic competition
between subuniverees of meaning of every conceivable sort becomes the
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normal state of affairs." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 86). Therefore, as
Berger discusses later in The Sacred Canopy (1967, pp. 131 • 149), the
issue of competing truth claims and the search for meaning that is required
so as to choose an authentic lifestyle in modem society (supra utde, p. 39),
as opposed to the uncritical reception of a I:radition, is an issue which is

relevant to modem, pluralistic, Post-Enlightenment, industrialized society.
It remains to be said, though, that even within these various subuniverses

of meaning all the various processes involved in legitimating that particular
world·view, as opposed to other, competing, world·views, still operate. These

processes, as mentioned above, are externalization, objectivation, and

internalization. Within objectivation social reality may become reified.
"Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were

things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms." (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 89).

To further 'explain' and 'justify' itself beyond the level of 'first-order'
objectivations of meaning society requires 'le~itimation.' "Legitimation as a

process is best described as a 'second-order' objectivation of meaning... The
function oflegicimation is to make objectively available and subjectively
plausible the 'first-order' objectivations that have been institutionalized."
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 92). Legitimation is required to facilitate
socialization from one generation to the next, for it is at this stage in society
that the 'self-evident' nature of soci~ty, or of institutions, requires

explanation and justification (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 93). There
are different levels of legitimation: firstly, there is self-evident, pretheoretical, knowledge; secondly, proverbs, moral maxims, and wise sayings

develop as a folk-lore surrounding the pre-theoretical level oflegitimation;
thirdly, as a 'professional' class of storytellers, or, more particularly, law-
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givers, develops, then explicit theories surrounding the folk-lore will evolve;
the final level of legitimation is that of symbolic universes. "These are
bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning
and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality" (Berger and
Luclcmann, 1966, pp. 94 • 95).

This fourth level of legitimation, concerning the construction of symbolic
universes, represents the farthest limit by which legitimation is able to
provide an all encompassing system of meaning. This is achieved by being
able to incorporate the subjective experiences of individuals into an overall
order. "What is particularly important, the ma.ginal situations of the life of
the individual (marginal, that is, in not being included in the reality of
everyday existence in society) are also encompassed by the symbolic
universe ... The symbolic univei:-se is, of coun?e1 constn~cted by means of

social objectivations. Yet its meaning-bestowing capacity far exceeds the
domain of social life, so that the individual may 'locate' himself within it
even in his most solitary eXJ5eriences." (Berger and Ludemann, 1966, p. 96).
This over~arching ordering (nomos), or canopy, of meaning provides a

means by which the subjective apprehension of biographical experiences
(both the world-taken-for-granted, and those marginal situations, death in
particular, which fall outside the province of everyday lived experience) may

be incorporated into an overarching nomos, whereby one may be born, live,
and die 'correctly.' (Berger and Ludemann, 1966, pp. 97 • 104).

The origins of a symbolic universe have their roots in the
constitution of man. If man in society is a world-constructor, this is
made possible by his constitutionally given world-openness, which
already implies the conflict between order and chaos. Human
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existence is, ab initio, an ongoing e.xt.emalization. As man

ext.ernalizes himself, he constructs the world into which he
ext.ernalizes himself. In the process of ext.ernalization, he projects his
own meanings into reality. Symbolic universes, which proclaim that
all reality is humanly meaningful and call upon the entire cosmos to
signify the validity of human existence, constitute the farthest
reaches of this projection. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 104).

Therefore, in summary, symbolic universes supply a broader meaning to
those who 'inhabit' that symbolic universe, in that events which make "no
sense" (that is, events which fall outside the world-taken-for-granted)
require a deeper meaning for those who experience that event. Events
which call everyday reality into question (what Berger calls 'marginal
situations') likewise require the construction of a symbolic universe so as to

provide meaning for those who experience such events. Within a religious
context theodicies provide such a symbolic universe, or sacred canopy, so

as to provide a religious legitimation of such experiences as those which fall
outside the world-taken-for-granted (infra ui.de, pp. 63 - 64). These socially
constructed (through the dialectical process of externalization,
objectivation, and internalization) symbolic universes give meaning to such
marginal situations which fall outside everyday Jived experience by
incorporating those experiences into a wider frame of reference through the
inclusion of that experience within the symbolic universe. (Ainlay, in Hunter
and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 43 - 46).

Having considered the origins of symbolic universes, Berger and Luckmann
then proceed to examine how such symbolic universes may be maintained.
Given that such symbolic universes are precarious, and that the reality
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which they represent as the 'Reality' (or the 'Truth') may be brought into
question by competing truth claims from other over-arching symbolic
universes, then it is necessary for those within a particular symbolic
universe to maintain that symbolic universe as opposed to another.
Various forms of universe-maintenance are available. 'Therapy' as a form
of social control attempts to encourage acceptance of the institutional
definition of reality, whereas 'nihilation' attempts to deny the reality of
phenomena which do not fit within the co-ordinates of one's symbolic
universe. (Berger and Luclonann, 1966, pp. 112 - 114). Symbolic universes
may also be brought into question as societies move from a traditional
framework, where mythology and theology maintain the symbolic universe
of that. society, to a modern framework, where philosophy and science
distance the process of universe-maintenance (legitimation) from the worldtaken-for-granted of the shared experience of the inhabitants of that
society. This may lead to an anomic sense of meaninglessness and

'homelessness' for those within that society. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966,
pp. 110 - 112). Those with an interest in maintaining the established
political power within society tend to have an affinity with those who
·administer monopolistic traditions of universe-maintenance within society.

"In other words, conservative political forces tend to support the
monopolistic claims of the universal experts, whose monopolistic

organizations in turn tend to be politically conservative." (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 123). A,, mentioned previously (supra vide, p. 38)
"When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete
power interest, it may be called an ideology." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966,
p. 123).

Religion is such a symbolic universe which provides what Berger calls a
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'sacred canopy,' however this sacred canopy is open to empirical disM

confirmation as contemporary people are alienated from the pre-existing
sacred canopy because it does not address the reality of their lived
experience (by such things as anomic forces, pluralism of competing truth
claims, subjective secularization, the swing from 'public' to 'private' religious
expression, and so on). These empirical dis-confirmations require a

contemporary theodicy so as to provide meaning to modern people. This
denting of the sacred canopy leads to a 'precarious vision,' and to a sense of
anomic homelessness in contemporary society.

Because of the changes within society brought about by the forces of
modernity it is increasingly difficult for monopolistic claims of the universal
experts to gain prominence over another group of universal experts from
another symbolic universe because

. It is important to bear in mind that most modern societies are

pluralistic. This means that they have a shared core universe, taken
i

for granted as such, and different partial universes coexisting in a
state of mutual accommodation ... The pluralistic situation
presupposes an urban society with a highly developed division of
labour, a concomitant high differentiation in the social structure and
high economic surplus... The pluralistic situation goes with conditions
of rapid social change, indeed pluralism itself is an accelerating factor

.;

precisely because it helps to undermine the change-resistant efficacy
of the traditional definitions of reality. Pluralism encourages both

I

skepticism and innovation and is thus inherently subversive of the
taken-for-granted reality of the traditional status quo. (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 125).
53

'

II
'

I

,J

'

,I

I

One of the creative aspects of Berger {in particular) and Luckmann's work
is the synthesis they achieve between the pole,s of society as objective
reality (after Durkheim) and society as subjective reality (after Weber).
Part of this subjective reality is the process by which an individual comes to

apprehend society 'out there' as society 'in here.' This subjective
apprehension of society takes place through internalization; and through
socialization in particular.

The ontogenetic process by which this is brought, about is
socialization, which may be defined as the comprehensive and
consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a
society or a sector of it. Primary socialization is the first socialization

an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a
member of society. Secondary socialization is a'lJ' subsequent
process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors
of the objective world of his society. (Berger and Luclanann, 1966, p.
130).

Through the process of socialization the individual is given first, identity.

The child learns that he is what he is called... To be given an identity
involves being assigned a specific place in the world ... Subjective
appropriation of identity and subjective appropriation of the social
world are merely different aspects of the same process of
internalization, mediated by the same significant others. (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 132).

Second, through the process of socialization the individual is given meaning.
54

Primary socialization thus accomplishes what (in hindsight, of
course) may be seen as the most important confidence trick that
society plays on the individual • to make appear as necessity what is
in fact a bundle of contingencies, and thus to make meaningful the
accident of his birth. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 135).

The third attribute given to the individual through socialization is order.

In any case, the world of childhood is so constituted as to instill in the
individual anomic structure in which he may have confidence
that "everything is all right" • to repeat what is probably the most
frequent sentence mothers say to their crying offspring.(Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 136; infra uide, pp. 82 · 83).

To maintain the subjective reality as internalized from the objective reality
of society through socialization it is necessary that society maintain its
validity through such mechanisms as therapy and nihilation (supra uide, p.
52). For the individual to maintain their subjective 'grasp on reality' it is
important to retain proximity with like-minded others.

One cannot remain a Muslim outside the umma of Islam, a
Buddhist outside the sangha, and probably not a Hindu anywhere
outside India. Religion requires a religious community, and to live in a
religious world requires affiliation with that community. The
plausibility structures of religious conversion have been imitated by
secular agencies of alternation. The best examples are in the areas of
political indoctrination and psychotherapy. (Berger and Luckmann,
1966, p.158).
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The adage "extra ecc!esiam nulla salus." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.
158) implies that it is only possible to retain the plausibility of one's reality
(subjective and objective) insofar as one remains in close proximity with
others who share that reality. The socio-historical relativism of all symbolic
universes challenges such tight definitions of reality, for then 'the world'
becomes 'a world' set amongst others. (Berger and Lucl,mann, 1966, p.
172).

In The Social Construction of Reality (1966) Berger and Luclrmann provide

an important re-evaluation of the sociology of knowledge with respect to its
understanding of the social construction of reality. The issues they raise far
exceed the boundaries of sociology alone (they are concerned with all that
passes as 'knowledge' within society) and, as such, their work is of great
historical (with its use of the history of ideas) and philosophical (with its
discussion of'reality') importance too. Their discussion of the relationship
between objective and subjective aspects of society reconciles pre\<iously

contrary view points. This dialectic is central to their understanding of
society and of the place and role of humanity within society. "The point is
that society sets limits to the organism, as the organism sets limits to
society." (Berger and Lucl,mann, 1966, p.182). Whilst concerned at a
theoretical level, it is, nonetheless, Berger and Luckmann's intention that
the sociology of knowledge be relevant to the lived experience of humanity;
and that it lead to a humanizing of sociological theory.

'I"his object is society as part of the human world, made by men,
inhabited by men, and, in turn, malring men, in an ongoing historical
process. It is not the least fruit of humanistic sociology that it
reawakens our wonder at this astonishing phenomenon. (Berger and
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Luckmann, 1966, p. 189).
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THE SACRED CANOPY... Elements of a Sociological Them:v of

Religion (1967):

In The Sacred Canopy (1967) Berger applies "a general theoretical
perspective derived from the sociology of knowledge to the phenomenon of
religion." (Berger, 1967, p. v). This theoretical perspective is outlined by
Berger, along with Thomas Luckmann, in The Social Construction of
Reality (1966). Berger's contribution to the sociology of religion is unique,
and, in fact, quite outstanding. For, in The Sacred Canopy, Berger. writing in
his customarily clear and fluent way, demonstrates the relevance of the

sociology of religion to the main stream of the discipline of sociology by
locating the sociology of religion firmly within the orbit of the sociology of
knowledge. This achievement is outstanding in so far as the sociology of
religion has, on the whole, been peripheral to contemporary sociology and
not been given the attention it deserves. As with Luckmann, Berger
"criticized the taken-for-granted identification of religion exclusively with
what happens in formal religious organizations; and he denied that rituals
and doctrines exhausted the category of religious phenomena." (Bedford,
1989, p. 102). Berger's eclectic, and unique, synthesis of Durkheimian,
Weberian, Marxist, Schutzian, and Meadian theoretical perspectives
enables him to demonstrate the relevance of the sociology of religion,
utilizing the sociology of knowledge for its theoretical basis, to the
contemporary discipline of sociology. This synthesis which Berger achieves,
through a re-shaping of already existing material, results in "a unique way
oflooking at the data of everyday life." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter,
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 73).

As with Luckmann, Berger
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has often been at pains to situate his work in the framework of a
sociologyofknowledge which would go beyond the history of ideas and
penetrate the central sociological question of how human beings are
located in their social order. For both Berger and Ludemann, in fact,
'the most important task' of the sociology of religion 'is to analyse the
cognitive and normative apparatus by which a socially constituted
universe (that is, 'knowledge' about it) is legitimated' (Berger and
Luclonann, 1963, p. 424). (Beckford, 1989, p. 101).

Berger's thesis in The Sacred Canopy relies heavily upon the theoretical
framework which he developed in conjunction with Thomas Luckmann in
The Social Construction of Reality. As a consequence Berger seeks "to push
to the final sociological consequence an understanding of religion as a
historical product." (Berger, 1967, p. vi). To achieve this end Berger utilizes
the technique of phenomenological bracketing of truth claims, religious
propositions about the world, and theology. (Berger, 1967, p. v).

The first section of The Sacred Canopy (entitled 'Systematic Elements')
relies heavily upon The Social Construction of Reality. yet also expands and
elaborates upon the previous position, particularly wit:tt respect to the link
between the sociology of knowledge and religion.

The synthesis of Durkheim.ian (society as objective reality) and Weberian
(society as subjective reality) view points achieved by Berger allows for a
balance between the sociological reification of objective social reality and
the idealism of subjecti...-e meanings. With reference to Berger's synthesis of
Durkheimian and Weberian view points, Wuthnow maintains that
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an exclusive emphasis upon subjective meanings leads to
idealism; an emphasis on the objectivity of social reality leads to
sociological reification. Both are distortions of social reality. These
two he maintains, are correct only when seen together. (Wuthnow,

in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 75 • 76).

Berger goes on to say that "Society is a dialect;,c phenomenon in that it is a
human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet continuously
acts back upon its producer." (Berger, 1967, p. 3). This dialectic is at the
heart of B(irger's thesis, and consists of three factors, or 'moments' as

Berger calls them:

Externalization

- the outpouring of human being into the world.

Objectivation

- the product of externalization confronts its

original producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves.

Internalization

- structures of the external/objective world are

transformed into structures of the subjective consciousness. (Berger, 1967,
p. 4).

As mentioned previously (supra vide, pp. 38, 46, 52), because of the

instability, or precariousness, of the natural environment, humanity seeks

to order this environment so as to make it meaningful. This ordering
involves the process of externalization, which in turn involves the other two
'moments' in the three-fold dialectic of society; namely, objectivation and
internalization. Therefore, "the socially constructed world is, above all, an
ordering of experience. A meaningful order, a nomos, is imposed upon the

60

discrete experiences and meanings of individuals." (Berger, 1967, p. 19).
Language plays a central role in ordering and interpreting experience.
(Berger, 1967, p. 20). Given that this nomos is socially objectivated the
'knowledge' which surrounds it tends to be 'pre·theoretical' in nature.

(Berger, 1967, p. 21). It is this socially objectivated, pre-theoretical
knowledge which is internalized in the course of socialization. (Berger, 1967,
p. 21). Socialization may be considered to have 'succeeded' to the extent
that the world-taken-for-granted becomes internalized into the life of the
individual, and provides that individual with identity, meaning, and order.
(Berger, 1967, p. 24; supra vide, pp. 54 · 55). "In other words, to live in the
social world is to live an ordered and meaningful life. Society is the guardian
of order and meaning not only objectively, but subjectively as well, in its
structuring of individual consciousness. It is for this reason that radical
separation from the social world, or anomy, constitutes such a powerful

threat to the individual." (Berger, 1967, p. 21). When people, either as
individuals or as groups, are dis-located from the socially established nomos
they will experience anomy (Berger uses the Anglicized spelling as opposed

to 'Anomie'; Berger, 1967, p. 21). "The socially established nomos may thus
be understood, perhaps in its most important aspect, as a shield against
terror. Put differently, the most important function of society is nomization.

The anthropological presupposition for this is a human craving for meaning
that appears to have the force of instinct. Men are congenitally compelled

to impose a meaningful order upon reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 22).

This meaningful order may be called into question by those 'marginal
situations' which "reveal the innate precariousness of all social worlds."
(Berger, 1967, p. 23). These marginal situations include separation from
society, dreams and fantasy, and, above all else, death. "Seen in the
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perspective of society, every nomos is an area of meaning carved out of a
vast mass of meaninglessness, a small clearing of lucidity in a formless,
dark, always ominousjungle."(Berger, 1967, p. 23).

These symbolic, socially objectivated, universes of meaning provide a
canopy of taken-for-granted 'knowledge' wberebynomos and cosmos appear
t.o be one and the same reality (Berger, 1967, p. 25). This 'reality' may be
underst.ood anthropologically (a theory of human natw·e) or cosmologically
(as in more traditional societies; Berger, 1967, p. 25). Likewise, "Religion is
the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established. Put
differently, religion is cosmization in a sacred mode." (Berger, 1967, p. 25).

As part of the process of externalization, whereby meaning is poured out
into reality (Berger, 1967, p. 27), religion may be conceived of as "the
audacious attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly
significant." (Berger, 1967, p. 28). Given the effects of secularization in
contemporary society theories of human nature may assume a secular,
scientific definition. However, it is worth remembering that "Viewed
historically, most of man's worlds have been sacred worlds. Indeed, it
appears likely that only by way of the sacred was it possible for man to
conceive of the cosmos in the first place." (Berger, 1967, p. 27).

As with the discussion in The Social Construction of Reality Berger moves
from. the concerns of world-construction (the social construction of reality)
t.o the concerns of world-maintenance (legitimation) in his discussion in The
Sacred Canopy. "All socially construct--od worlds are inherently precarious.
Supported by human activity, they are constantly threatened by the facts
of self-interest and stupidity." (Berger, 1967, p. 29). Socialization serves t.o
internalize the socially constructed world within the subjective
62

consciousness of each of the members within a society. Social control
serves to contain individuals and groups within socially defined limits;
whereas, legitimation serves to explain andjustify that socially constructed
world. "By legitimation is meant socially objectivated 'knowledge' that
serves to explain and justify the social order. Put differently, legitimations
are answers to any questions about the 'why' of institutional

arrangements." (Berger, 1967, p. 29). Berger's discussion oflegitimation in
The Sacred Canopy closely follows that put forward by Berger and
Ludemann in The Social Construction of Reality (supra vule, pp. 49 - 51).
What is unique in the present volume is the way Berger discusses religion
and legitimation. Berger firstly reaffirms several points made, with
Ludemann, in The Social Construction of Reality; namely, that the nomos
provided by a symbolic universe involves "an all embracing
Weltamchauung." (Berger, 1967, p. 32). Then, reiterating that "The

essential purpose of all forms of legitimation may be described as realitymaintenance, both on the objective and the subjective levels." (Berger,
1967, p. 32). Then Berger goes on to make the link between religion and
legitimation. "All legitimation maintains socially defined reality. Religion
legitimates so effectively because it relates the precarious reality
constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality." (Berger, 1967, p.
32). Raving made this connection Berger further suggests that "Religion
legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid
ontological statns, that ls, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic
frame of reference." (Berger, 1967, p. 33). However, with respect to the link
between religion and legitimation, Berger goes on to suggest that "Religion
thus serves to maintain the reality of that socially constructed world within
which men exist in their everyday lives. Its legitimating power, however,
has another important dimension - the integration into a comprehensive
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nomos of precisely those marginal situations in which the reality of
everyday life is put in question." (Berger, 1967, p. 42). These marginal
situations include:

sleep;
the transition between sleep and wakefulness;
dreams and nightmares;
death;
natural catastrophe;

war;
social upheaval;
the 'official' exercise of violence, for instance, in capital punishment;
physical illness; and
mental illness.

These marginal situations involve "standing, or stepping, outside reality as
commonly defined." (Berger, 1967, p. 43). Marginal situations are, according
to Berger, moments of 'ecstasy' where the individual "steps out, alone, to

face the dark." (Berger, 1963, p. 171; Berger, 1967, p. 43). In other words,
religion incorporates those experiences which would otherwise fall outside
the world-taken-for-granted within a socially legitimated symbolic universe.
In so doing, the fear of anomy is alleviated by an all embracing, sacred

canopy of meaning.

Berger draws a clear link between religion and society by suggesting that
religion is one of the great legitimating forces within society, and that
religion and society share the same origin. "Rather, the point is that the
same human activity that produces society also produces religion, with the
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relation between the two products always being a dialectical one." (Berger,
1967, p. 47). Furthermore, Berger adds that "The implication of the rootage
of religion in human activity is not that religion is always a dependent
variable in the history of a society, but rather that it derives its objective
and subjective reality from human beings, who produce and reproduce it in
their ongoing lives." (Berger, 1967, p. 48).

This raises the issne of the plausibility and credibility of religion. "The power
of religion depends, in the last resort, upon the credibility of the banners it
puts into the hands of men as they stand before death, or more accurately,
as they walk, inevitably, toward it." (Berger, 1967, p. 51). This is the
problem of theodicy. Traditionally, theodicies sought to provide an
explanation (religious legitimation) of how to live through anomic
phenomena, and are typically eXPlained in terms of the nomos (sacred
canopy) established in the society in question (Berger, 1967, p. 53).
Theodicies were often seen as the solution to individual suffering (a solution
to the problem of evil). Weber terms such things as the legitimation of
political authority, or the assuagement of social rebellion, as the 'theodicy of
suffering.' (Berger, 1963, p. 134; supra uide, p. 38). The need people have for

such theodicies, so as to provide meaning in otherwise meaningless
situations, is highlighted by Ritschl

From the bird's-eye view of the historian all this may not seem to
have been tragic because in the course of decades and centuries such
events can prove favourable or fade away. However, for the person

alive at the time this perspective means little or nothing. Millions of
people live in a state of hopeless aporia, in which any decision is
meaningless. By that I mean not only the poor, say in West Africa,
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Asia and South America, but also their and our politicians, who are
entangled in obligations before they even begin the process of
decision. The history I have described behind the tragedy of world
history consists of the untold individual stories of children who grew
up in anxiety and hatred, mothers with too many demands made on
them, failed marriages, disappointed husbands, embittered old people
• individual destinies which are not only unfulfilled but unfulfillable.
(Ritschl, 1986, p. 194).

For "It is not happiness that theodicy primarily provides, but meaning."
(Berger, 1967, p. 58). This meaning is required by society, and individuals

within society, by virtue of the anomic forces which disrupt, or even
destroy, the established order.

Every nomos is established, over and over again, against the threat
of destruction by the anomic forces endemic to the human condition.

In religious terms, the sacred order of the cosmos is reaffirmed, over
and over again, in the face of chaos. It is evident that this fact poses
a problem on the level of human activity in society, inasmuch as this
activity must be so institutionalized as to continue despite the
recurrent intrusion into individual and collective experience of the
anomic (or, if one prefers, denomizing) phenomena of suffering, evil
and, above all, death. However, a problem is also posed on the level of
legitimation. The anomic phenomena must not only be lived through,
they must also be explained - to wit, explained in terms of the nomos
established in the society in question. An explanation of these
phenomena in terms of religious legitimations, of whatever degree of
theoretical sophistication, may be called a theodicy. (Berger, 1967,
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p. 53).

Theodicies, as socially constructed religious legitimations, provide an overarchlng canopy of meaning for those who inhabit that canopy of meaning.
Theodicies serve to maintain the institutional order oYin society. "Put
simply, theodicies provide the poor with a meaning for their poverty, but
may also provide the rich with a meaning for their wealth. In both cases the
result is one ofworld-maint.enance and, very concretely, of the maintenance

of the particular institutional order." (Berger, 1967, p. 59). To dis-confirm
this theodicy is to create enormous social change as well. "In all cases, the
disintegration of the plausibilityoftheodicies legitimating social inequalities
is potentially revolutionary in its consequences" (Berger, 1967, p. 60). The
Western/Christian theodicy has, through secularization and pluralism,
suffered from empirical dis-confirmation and, therefore, has declined in

plausibility too. (Berger, 1967, pp. 78 - '79; infra vide, pp. 69 - 70).

Berger, in the second half of The Sacred Canopy ('Historical Elements'),
goes on to discuss the effect secularization has upon religious legitimation,
and the problem of the plausibility of religion caused by secularization (and
suggests in a few pages a way forward out of this problem in Appendix II,
Sociological and Theological Perspectives, which he later develops and uses

as the basis of A Rumour of Angels (1969) ). However, throughout the
whole volume ( of The Sacred Cano!!Y) Berger remains faithful to his
expressed int.ention of pushing "to the final sociological consequence an
understanding of religion as a historical product." (Berger, 1967, p. v).

In spite of the collapse of traditional theodicies Berger maintains that

religion (those signals of transcendence, in particular; infra vide, p. 82 - 88)
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still has a place to play in human culture. This thesis describes and outlines
the ways in which Berger explores what aspects of religious meaning are
compatible with modernity. This is the problem oflegitimating a theodicy in
Post-Enlightenment society.

Legitimating a theodicy that has plausibility for contemporary society
involves the construction of a system of meaning which is relevant to the
lived experience of those living within Post-Enlightenment society. Such a
contemporary theodicy needs to include such factors as the
interrelationship between self, others, the world, and the transcendent so as
to provide some basis for an authentic and meaningful existence (supra
vide, p. 39). This task, of legitimating a contemporary theodicy, is taken up

by Berger in A Rumour of Angels ( 1969 ).

Given that a religious legitimation of the socially constructed reality (a
theodicy) requires a fundamental attitude which is "in itself quite irrational",
and that "This attitude is the surrender of self to the ordering power of

society. Put differently, every nomos entails a transcendence of
individuality" (Berger, 1967, p. 54); then there is a sense in which religion is
an agent of alienation. Alienation "is the process whereby the dialectical
relationship between the indi.vidual and his world is lost to consciousness.
The individual 'forgets' that this world was and continues to be co-produced
by him." (Berger, 1967, p. 85). Religion has been such an effective agent of
alienation because it posits that the sociallyobjectivated knowledge of that
which it considers to be reality is in fact of cosmic or divine, not human,
origin. Because of this, social institutions which are deemed by religion to be
of sacred or di.vine origin (for instance: monarchy, marriage, church, law,
and so on) are seen to be necessities over which one, as a member of that
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society, has no choice or control. 'Bad faith' and 'false consciousness' (supra
vi.de, pp. 23, 39, 42) then ensue because the individual feels alienated from

society and that they are not able to influence the institutions which are, in
fact, created by, and always interacting with, humanity. Therefore any
contemporary theodicy, or system of meaning, must be able to be
historically concerned (that is, conscious of its originE: and open to the

future), empirical (that is, open to scrutiny and review), inductive (that is,
dealing with concrete reality, not abstract theory), and concerned with
people's lived experience.

In Section II of The Sacred Canopy Berger examines the 'Historical
Elements' of his sociological theory of religion. The process of secularization,
along with pluralism (supra vide, p. 53), is held by Berger to be of central
importance as an influence upon contemporary religion and religious
institutions. Berger defines secularization as "the process by which sectors
of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious

institutions and symbols." (Berger, 1967, p. 107). This phenomenon is a
modern one, particularly powerful in Western society (Berger, 1967, p. 108;

supra vide, pp. 25 - 28). The economic process of industrial capitalism,
accompanied by political secularization, along with the Protestant worldview which divested itself of such 'sacred' elements as mystery, miracle,

and magic led to a situation where "Religiously speaking, the world becomes
very lonely indeed." (Berger, 1967, p. 112). In this situation law and ethics
replace the timeless cosmic order (Berger, 1967, p. 119). As 'the ch:irch'
becomes the sphere of 'the sacred' it defines itself over and against 'the
world' and, as such, develops a doctrine of 'two spheres' (one holy, the other
profane; supra vide, pp. 19 - 20). The 'secular world' then achieves a status
which is, in fact, a theological legitimation (Berger, 1967, p. 123). As people
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have become increasingly dis-enfranchized, through the process of
secularization, from the religious legitimations which were, but no longer
are, meaningful then there is a serious problem of plausibility for these
religious legitimations. This is because the process of secularization has
lessened people's readiness to give their assent to a metaphysic which is
open to empirical clis-confirmation. It needs to 'ring true,' that is, to be true
to peop!e's lived experience. Furthermore, the competing truth claims

(pluralism), and availability of options (be they religious, philosophical, or to
do with 'life-style') has led to a deinstitutionalization of religion. The
normative claims of one religion, or sacred canopy, balance out the claims

of the others. This, in tum, leads to a pluralistic market situation (Berger,
1967, p. 138), where "a 'religious preference' can be abandoned as readily as
it was first adopted." (Berger, 1967, p. 134). In this situation "insofar as
religion is common it lacks reality, and insofar as it is 'real' it lacks

commonality." (Berger, 1967, p. 134). This process of secularization and
pluralism seems to accompany a deinstitutionalization of meaning (supra

vide, pp. 52 - 53). The legitimations which maintained the former social
construction of reality and linked the precarious social reaiity found in

society with ultimate reality have proved to be inadequate given the lived
experience of people. As such, the theodicies which legitimated the socially
constructed reality became open to dis-confirmation. That these theodicies
were linked to political structures which used these theodicies to legitimate
their position or power (for instance, the bureaucratization of the church;

Berger, 1963, pp. 46 - 47; 1967, p. 140), to question the theodicy was a
political action as well as a religious one (supra vide, p. 67). Therefore, there
is a need to legitimate a contemporary theodicy which is true to people's
lived experience.
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Berger, by linking the function of a theodicy with that of making meaning
(supra vi.de, p. 66), allows for theodicies t.o be conceived of in the broader

context of making meaning in contemporary society. As such, a

contemporary theodicy needs t.o include (indeed, it needs to be inclusive,
rather than exclusive) such factors as the relationship between self, others,
the world, and the transcendent so as to provide some basis for an

authentic and meaningful existence (supra vide, p. 39). There is a need for a
more inclusive theodicy (other than the traditional individualistic type)
which has hermeneutic concern for the 'whole' (wholeness of self, wholeness
in relationships with others, wholeness with the world/environment, and
wholeness with the transcendent). However, this 'wholeness' will not be
provided by over-arching (public) structures or systems; it will need t.o be
through chosen, private means which reflect the Post-Modernist situation
where 'closure' on a grand scale is unobtainable (Marshall, 1992, pp. 192 •
193). Berger's work provides the possibility for this legitimation of a
theodicy (or theodicies) which will provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment
society (infra vi.de, pp. 74 - 88).

Given that religion (that is, socially constructed religious legitimations)
served to provide a coherent over·arching sacred canopy for a society, it

remains to be said that due to the secularization, and subsequent pluralism,
of/in society it is conceivable that such over-arching (public) religious
universes will continue to lose their legitimating power and that more
private, chosen religious preferences will pre-dominate with various sub-

universes competing for membership. (Berger, 1967, pp. 127 · 153).
Objective 'truth' is de-objectivated, or 'subjectivized.' (Berger, 1967, p. 157).
Berger maintains that the factors which led t.o "this crisis of religion on the
level of commonsense knowledge is not due to any mysterious
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metamorphoses of consciousness, but can he explained in terms of
empirically available developments in the social structures and social
psychology of modern societies." (Berger, 1967, p. 156). These
developments are outlined in 'The Background to B.erger's Thought' (supra
vide, pp. 16 - 31).

Berger sums up The Sacred Canopy by defining religion as "a human
projection, grounded in specific infrastructures of human history." (Berger,
1967, p. 180). However, Berger insists that itis

Only after the theologian has confronted the historical relativity of
religion can he genuinely ask where in this history it may, perhaps,
be possible to speak of discoveries - discoveries, that is, that

transcend the relative character of their infrastructures. And only
after he has really grasped what it means to say that religion is a
human product or projection can he begin to search, within this
array of projections, for what may turn out to be signals of
transcendence. I strongly suspect that such an inquiry will turn
increasingly from the projections to the projector, that is, will become

an enterprise in anthropology. An 'empirical theology' is, of course,
methodologically impossible. But a theology that proceeds in a step·
by-step correlation with what can be said about man empirically is
well worth a serious try.

It is in such an enterprise that a conversation between sociology and
theology is most likely to bear intellectual fruits. It will be clear from
the above that this will require partners, on both sides, with a high
degree of openness. In the absence of such partners, silence is by far
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the better course. (Berger, 1967, p. 185; infra uide, pp. 86 • 87, 95).

Berger, as it happens, did not remain silent. He proceeded to attempt such
a correlation between theology and humanity (based upon sociological
theory) in his work A Rumour of Angels ... Morlern Society and the
Recliscovery ofthfl_Supematural (1969) (infra uide, pp. 74 · 88).

',,
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A RUMOUR OF ANGELS .•• Modern Society and the Rediscovery of
the Supernatural (1969):

A Rumour of Angels represents the culmination of an argument which
Berger developed over the course of the material reviewed in this section.

Berger begins with Invitation to Sociology (1963) in which he develops a
general understanding of sociology. This understanding is one which is
greatly influenced by the sociology of knowledge. Berger uses the sociology
of knowledge to develop an understanding of the social construction of
reality in the book of the same name, together with Thomas Luckmann,
namely: The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Berger and Luckmann
suggest that universes of meaning are created and maintained, through
social processes, within society. One such universe of meaning is religion,

and Berger analyses religion using an understanding developed within the
sociology of knowledge in his book The Sacred Canopy (1967). So as t-0 avoid
the suggestion of methodological atheism, at the conclusion of The Sacred
Canopy Berger suggests an approach to religion which he develops in A
Rumour of Angels (1969) (supra vide, p. 72) which, nonetheless, retains a
systematic methodology, as developed in The Social Construction of Reality
and The Sacred Canopy. and sociological perspective.

Berger, in the Introduction to the 1990 edition of A Rumour of Angels,
explains his rationale for completing the programme outlined above.

First, I wanted to show how the intellectual tools of the social
sciences, which had contributed greatly to the loss of credibility of
religion, could be turned on the very ideas that had thus discredited
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supernatural views of the world and on the people propagating those
· ideas. I called this project 'relativizing the relativizers.' And second, I
wanted to draw a very rough sketch of an approach to theologizing
that began with ordinary human experience, more specifically with
elements of that experience that point toward a reality beyond the
ordinary. I called this approach 'inductive' and I indicated a number
of experiential complexes that could be considered 'signals of
transcendence.' I suggested that here was to be found the basis of a
theological program rooted in what Europeans call philosophical
anthropology and in the broad tradition of liberal Protestantism
stretching back to Friedrich Schleiermacher. Unlike many
expressions of the liberal Protestant tradition, however, such a
program would not secularize the religious definitions of reality; on
the contrary, it would, as it were, transcendentalize secularity.

(Berger, 1969, pp. ix - x).

Berger's humanistic concern is also an important factor in seeing through
this project. "Put differently, keeping alive the rumour of angels is to
contribute to the humanization of our time." (Berger, 1969, p. xiii).

As Berger outlined in The Sacred Canopy (supra uide, pp. 69 - 70),

secularization and pluralism have profoundly shaken the foundations of the
traditional supernatural world-view. Berger defines the term 'supernatural'
as denoting "a fundamental category of religion, namely the assertion or
belief that there is an other reality, and one of ultimate significance for man,
which transcends the reality within which our everyday experience unfolds.
It is this fundamental assumption about reality, rather than this or that
historical variation of it, that is allegedly defunct or in the process of
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/;

becoming defunct in the modern world." (Berger, 1969, p. 2).

Berger's concern is how to correlate the supernatural with the life-world, or
world-taken-for-wanted "within which we carry on our 'normal' activities in
collaboration with other men." (Berger, 1969, p. 3).

Given that fewer people, at least within modern societies, are able to
connect in any meaningful way with the religious legitimations which owe
their origin to times and places far removed from the contemporary
situation there is, as mentioned above (supra vide, pp. 69 ~ 70), a need to

construct, or legitimate, a theodicy, or system of meaning, which is relevant
to people in modern society. However, those who suggest that it is possible
to hold a socio-historical world-view consistent with the sociology of
knowledge, yet who also assent to the place of the supernatural within that
world-view will find themselves in a 'cognitive minority.' (Berger, 1967, pp.
184 · 185; Berger, 1969, pp. 6 - 7). Such a person holding such a view is on
the outside of socially legitimated views on religion, society, and philosophy:
religion, because of the way revelation is central to 'orthodox' belief; society,
because so many people within contemporary society are dis-enfranchized
with such an orthodox view of religion in particular, and with organized
religion in general; and philosophy, because the prevailing intellectual
'orthodoxy' does not admit to the place of the supernatural. It is into this
unenviable situation that Berger sets forth the place and validity of the
supernatural within contemporary society.

Berger refers to the 'Protestantization' of religious groups which is a result
of the increasing secularization and pluralism within modern society. Berger
is, nonetheless, an admirer of the honesty which Protestantism
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(particularly such theologians as Schleiermacher) has maintained in its
interaction with modernity." It was Protestantism that first underwent the
onslaught of secularization; Protestantism that first adapted itself to
societies in which several faiths existed on equal terms, the pluralism that

may be regarded as a twin phenomenon of secularization, and it was
Protestant theology that the cognitive challenges to traditional
supernaturalism were first met and fought through." (Berger, 1969, p. 17).

It is in this tradition that Berger sets forth his thesis on the relevance of the
supernatural in contemporary society. Not in a spirit of accommodation, or
reduction, or translation, but by developing an inductive theology (or
theodicy, or system of meaning; Berger, 1969, p. 22).

From the perspective of sociology (in particular, from the sociology of
knowledge and the history of ideas) Berger argues that it is possible to 'see
clearly' (supra vide, pp. 35 · 36), or to be able to 'relativize the relativizers.'
(Berger, 1969, p. 31). This socio-historical world-view has come about
through the development of various intellectual movements. Berger refers
to several of these movements, citing in particular:

the physical sciences

- where such people as Copernicus and

Galileo challenged the cosmology of the Middle Ages;

therevolutioninbiology - where humanity is not only alone
cosmologically, but also subject to physical forces which are common to all
other creatures;

the hum.an sciences

- historical scholarship highlighted the
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historicity of all religious traditions, and psychology attributed much within
the religious traditions as being a projection of human needs and desires;
and

the history ofideas and the sociology of knowledge

• highlight the

relativity of the religious traditions. (Berger, 1969, pp. 33 - 36).

The sociology of knowledge, which provides a sociological perspective on the
above developments, is one of the chief means Berger employs to carry out
his task of'relativizing the relativizers.' (Berger, 1969, p. 38). The sociology
ofknowledge

is concerned with studying the relationship between human
thought and the social conditions und~r which it occurs ... One of the
fundamental propositions of the sociology of knowledge is that the
plausibility, in the sense of what people actually find credible, of
views of reality depends upon the social support these receive. Put
more simply, we obtain our notions about the world originally from
other human beings, and these notions continue to be plausible to us
in a very large measw-e because others continue to affirm them.

(Berger, 1969, p. 38).

Various factors such as social definitions of reality, social relations that
take these for granted, as well as the supporting therapies (social controls)
and legitimations provide a plausibility structure of the conception in
question. (Berger, 1969, pp. 39 · 40). Plausibility structures help to
maintain the integrity or uniqueness of a conception, institution, or any

form of socially constructed reality. Berger maintains that the same
78

mechanisms apply to the construction and maintenance of all forms of
socially constructed reality. (Berger, 1969, p. 42). The formula "extra
ecclesiam nulla salus" ("there is no salvation outside the church."), may just

as well be put as the proposition that there is "no plausibility without the
appropriate plausibility structure." (Berger, 1969, p. 42; supra vide, p. 56).

The mystery of faith now becomes scientifically graspable,
practiceJly repeatable, and generally applicable. The magic
disappears as the mechanisms of plausibility generation and
plausibility maintenance become transparent. The community of
faith is now understandable as a constructed entity • it has been
constructed in a specific human history, by human beings ... The

formula, once an affirmation of unique authority, thus becomes a
general rule ... In other words, the theologian's world has become one

world among many - a generalization of the problem of relativity that
goes considerably beyond the dimensions of the problem as posed by
historical scholarship. To put it simply. History posits the problem of
relativity as a fact, the sociology of knowledge as a necessity of our

condition. (Berger, 1969, p. 42).

Various attempts have been made by theologians to dismiss this view,
most notably the Neo-Orthodox distinction between 'religion' and 'Christian
faith.' (supra vide, p. 21). The effect of this view was to provide a theological
legitimation of secularization. (supra vide, p. 69). Berger, however, is not
prepared to pretend that such insights as put forward by the sociology of
knowledge do not exist, or that such insights are unimportant; Berger
attaches great importsnce to the insights of the sociology of knowledge, for
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When everything has been subsumed under the r alativizing
categories in question (those of history, of the sociology of knowledge,
or what-have-you), the question of truth reasserts itself in almost
pristine simplicity. Once we know that all human affirmations are
subject to scientifically graspable socio-historical processes, which
affirmatio,u; are true and which are false? (Berger, 1969, p. 45).

The situation in contemporary society is one of pluralism, which includes
"any situation in which there is more than one world view available to the

members of a society, that is, a situation in which there is competition

between world views." (Berger, 1969, p. 47). Modern society is less able to
provide firm plausibility structure, and hence pluralism develops, because

Modern societies are, by their nature, highly differentiated and
segmented, while at tbe same time allowing for a high degree of
communication between their segmented subsocieties. The reasons

for this, while complex, are not all mysterious. They result from the
degree of division oflabour brought about by industrial forms of
production, and from the patterns of settlement, social stratification,
and communication engendered by industrialism. (Berger, 1969, pp.
47 - 48).

This pluralistic situation requires one to choose from amongst competing
world-views for a system of meaning. Such institutions as tribe or clan are
no longer able to provide simple and all-embracing plausibility structures.
The individual in modern society resides amongst competing sub-universes
which tend to be secular (work, recreation, and community). This has
largely contributed to the decline in the potency (plausibility) of traditional
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religious legitimations. The plausibility structures which previously defined
'the faith' are now on the edge, rather than at the centre, of modem society.
So much so that it is possible to say that people now inhabit a different
world. However, the present situation is just as much influenced by the
same legitimating forces as in any other age; it simply manifests itself
differently. (Berger, 1969, pp. 49 • 50). Gaede states that

Society is pluralistic; it evidences heterogeneity of religious
experiences and truth claims; we must take all or these empirical
phenomena seriously; therefore, we cannot accept as a prior claim

an exclusive truth. Thus the starting point of Berger's critique is an
empirical statement about the nature of modern social conditions,
from which he draws an epistemological conclusion about method,
out of which he will derive (one may assume) some ontological
assertions about religious truth. In other words, here once again is

evidence of the impact of his sociological conception of reality upon
his theological endeavour. (Gaede, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p.
171).

Given that, as Berger maintains, nothing is immune from the relativization
of socio-historical analysis, is it at all possible to legitimate a system of
meaning that is "in, with, and under" (Berger, 1969, p. 52) the human
projections which constitute religion? And is this system of meaning a
pointer to a reality which may be called supernatural? Berger believes so,
and begins his inductive theologizing by starting with humanity. In other
words, Berger uses anthropology as the starting point for his theology. This
theology is not "an empirical theology · that would be logically impossible ·
but rather a theology of very high empirical sensitivity that seeks to
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correlate its propositions with what can be empirically known." (Berger,
1969, p. 53).

Berger suggests that various 'signals of transcendence,' which are
constituted by 'prorotypica.l human gestures,' provide the starting point for
this inductive theology. (Berger, 1969, p. 59). These signals of
transcendence are "phenomena that are to be found within the domain of
our 'natural' reality but that appear to point beyond that reality." (Berger,
1969, p. 59). And, by prototypical human gestures Berger means "certain
reiterated acts and experiences that appear to express essential aspects of
man's bei11g, of the human animal as such." (Berger, 1969, p. 59). Berger
does not mean that these prototypical human gesbu-es are 'archetypal' in a
Jungian sense; rather, they belong, not in the depths but, in the realm of
"ordinary everyday awareness." (Berger, 1969, pp. 59 • 60).

Berger uses a similar line of argument here to the one he used regarding
freedom in his previous book Inyjtation to Sociology (1963) (supra vide, pp.
23, 39 • 40). This argument is grounded in a humanistic
(Kantian/phenomenological) epistemology. (Abercrombie, in Hunter and
Ainlay, 1986, p. 12).

The first of Berger's signals of transcendence is Berger's argument from
order. (Berger, 1969, pp. 60 · 64). There is a propensity for order in society,
as opposed to anomy. This 'nomization' is an inductive experience whereby
fundamental trust in reality is expressed (Kung, 1980, p. 568 ff. ). It is most
evident in the comforting of a child by its parent. When the parent says to
the child "Don't be afraid - everything is in order, everything is all right.", the
parent's reassurance transcends "the immediat.ely present two individuals
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and their situation, [and] implies a statement about reality as such." (Berger,
1969, p. 62). Berger goes on to say that

The argument from ordering is metaphysical rather than ethical. To
restate it: In the observable human propensity to order reality there
is an intrinsic impulse to give cosmic scope to this order, an impulse

that implies not only that human order in some way corresponds to
an order that transcends it, but that this transcendent order is of
such a character that man can trust himself and his destiny to it.
(Berger, 1969, pp. 63 • 64).

Berger's argument here, and with the other signals of transcendence, relies

on an inductive process. (supra vide, pp. 29 · 30). "By 'inductive faith,' then,
I mean a religious process of thought that begins with facts of human
experience; conversely, 'deductive faith' begins with certain assumptions

(notably assumptions about divine revelation) that cannot be tested by
experience." (Berger, 1969, pp. 64 • 65). This line of argument is consistent
with Berger's use of a humanistic, particularly Kantian, epistemology. Kant
drew a distinction between 'Phenomena' (things as they appear), and
'Noumena' (things in themselves). Kant maintains that we cannot prove

the noumenal, we can only prove the phenomenal. (Kling, 1980, pp. 537 •
551; supra vide, p. 26). Furthermore, apart from being derived from
·experience and empirical reality, the signals of transcendence belong to the
common person and are consistent with Berger's emphasis (following
Schutz) on the 'paramount reality of everyday life.' (supra vide, pp. 43 • 44).

The second signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from play.
(Berger, 1969, pp. 65 • 68). Play is a basic experience of humanity (as is

83

order). To play might involve the play of children, or of the musician, or of
the lovers, or the artist, or the actor. "In playing, one steps out of one time

into another." (Berger, 1969, p. 65). Play is usually a joyful experience, and

seems to bracket the 'serious' reality of life; yet it is "readily found in the
reality of ordinary life." (Berger, 1969, p. 67). Though there is no way of
proving it, it remains to be said tt.'et in play one enters another

(eternal/supernatural) world.

The third signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from hope (Berger,
1969, pp. 68 - 73), whereby meaning may be found in those experiences
which threaten socially constructed reality. Frankl (1969) is quoted by
Coward (1990, p. 162) as claiming

that a person finds meaning in life through self-transcendence in
three ways. The first is giving to the world through creativity, such
as in family, occupation, and creative works. The second is taking

from the world by being receptive to others and to one's environment.
The third is finding meaning in the attitude one takes to one's
predicament when faced with an unchangeable situation. Life can
never cease to have meaning because, even when one is deprived of

both the creative and experiential ways to find meaning, there
remains the opportunity to determine the manner in which one faces

adversity.

In true Existential style, Berger suggests that absurdity cannot be avoided;
however, meaninglessness can.

The fourth signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from drunnation
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(Berger, 1969, pp. 73 • 77), where when humanity is violated to such an
extent that there is a cry for justice. There seems to be something
fundamental to human nature which abhors injustice and inhumanity.
Putting it positively, there is a profound care for humanity at the heart of
our existence. (Berger, 1969, p. 181).

The fifth signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from humour.
(Berger, 1969, pp. 77 • 81). Berger uses the argument from humour to
reflect "the imprisonment ofthe human spirit in the world." (Berger, 1969, p.
78). This (tragi·) comic perspective relates to Berger's notions of freedom
and social responsibility, which are arrived at through the process of

sociological understanding ('Verstehen').

Another option is what we regard as the most plausible one to result
from sociological understanding, one that can combine compassion,
limited commitment and a sense of the comic in man's social

carnival. This will lead to a posture vis-a-vis society based on a
perception of the latter as essentially a comedy, in which men parade
up and down with their gaudy costumes, change hats and titles, hit
each other with sticks they have or the ones they can persuade their
fellow actors to believe in. Such a comic perspective does not
overlook the fact that non-existent sticks can draw real blood, but it

will not from this fact fall into the fallacy of mistaking the Potemkin
village for the City of God. If one views society as a comedy, one will
not hesitate to cheat, especially ifby cheating one can alleviate a
little pain here or make life a little brighter there. One will refuse to
take seriously the rules of the game, except insofar as these rules
protect real human beings and foster real human values. Sociological
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Machiavellianism is thus the very opposite of cynical opportunism.
It is the way in which freedom can realize itself in social action.
(Berger, 1963, pp. 184 - 185).

All of these signals of transcendence belong to the common person (not to
'spiritual virtuosi'), and all are inductive in so far as they are taken from the
empirical reality of lived experience. They are all pre-theoretical and are
from the 'bottom-up.' That is, they are concerned with 'everyday reality.'
Berger makes no claims to providing "an exhaustive or exclusive list of
human gestures that may be seen as signals of transcendence." (Berger,

1969, p. 81). Other possible signals of transcendence which could perhaps
be included (so as to provide an extension and update of Berger's
suggestions) might be such gestures as:

a sense of care similar to the giving and receiving mentioned by
Frankl (supra vide, p. 84);

significant relationships in which the above care is lived out;

a fundamental trust in reality which stems from the above care.
(Kling, 1980, p. 568 ff.; Berger, 1992, p. 134); and

a sense of wholeness (with self, with others, with the
world/environment, and with the transcendent).

In all of the above Berger seeks to revive "a spirit of patient induction and

an attitude of openness to the fullness of human experience, especially as
this experience is accessible to historical inquiry.• (Berger, 1969, p. 94). As
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such, Berger would p:refer to use the term 'discoveries' as opposed to
'revelation,' for the concept of revelation requires a deductive theological
methodology, whereas the concept of discoveries requires an inductive
theological methodology. (supra vide, p. 72).

Berger does not seek to prescribe the outworking of the signals of
transcendence in a practical way, other than to say that confronting the
traditions in a spirit of open dialogue and humility will enable the search for
signals of transcendence to take place wherever they may be found.
(Berger, 1969, pp. 94 • 98). This may involve the emergence of new groups
which bear little or no resemblance to the traditional religious institutions,
or it may be that the traditional religious institutions will adapt their
practices to incorporate such signals of transcendence. (Berger, 1969, p.
99). In ali of this though, one prototypical gesture will remain in Berger's

opinion; and that is worship, whereby humanity "reaches out in hope
toward transcendence." (Berger, 1969, p. 100).

Berger's humanistic concern compels him to maintain that 'penultimate'
events find "their ultimate significance ... in a reality that transcends them

and that transcends the empirical coordinates of human existence."
(Berger, 1969, p. 181). Again, it is immediately apparent the great influence
which Bonhoeffer has had upon Berger. (supra vi.de, p. 20). The moral and

political issues of modern society, which were of such grave concern for
Bonhoeffer, must also be confronted in Berger's opinion, for the religious
perspective is one which values and cares for the human. (Berger, 1969, p.
181). Truth, for Berger, is essentially a religious concept. (Berger, 1969, p.
182). And only by honestly searching for truth and justice will "the

redeeming gestures of love, hope, and compassion ... [be] reiterated in
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human experience." (Berger, 1969, p. 106).

Here Berger concludes his dialogue with contemporary society which takes
the form of ARumour of Angels.
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CHAPl'ER IV: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL
THEMES IN BERGER'S WORK

Chapter Four provides an examination of the central themes in Berger's
work, and is an attempt to examine and outline four core areas of Berger's

work which may be identified from Chapter Three; namely: Berger's
methodology; Berger's discussion of secularization and pluralism; Berger's

ethical and political position; and Berger's discussion of religious meaning
and modernity.

Berger's latest work: A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of
Credulity (1992) forms a central part of this chapter, in that it highlights
some of the ways in which Berger re"works and expands some of the
themes he deals with in the works reviewed in Chapter Three; and in that it
also highlights some developments in Berger's thought.
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Berger's Methodology:

Peter L. Berger, it would seem, is not taken seriously by the sociological
'establishment.' Whilst most commentstors agree that he is an accessible
and widely read contributor to sociological discourse, he is severely
admonished for not ever having developed a, or contributed significantlyto,
sociological theory (something which Berger vigorously denies; confer
Berger, in Hunter and Ain!ay, 1986, p. 224). Berger does not appear in the
listings of the 'Who's Who' of the social sciences, or in the sociological
annuals, or in many dictionaries of sociology. However, he is one of the most
widely read, living, sociologists. (Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 2 - 3).
Wuthnow, commenting on Berger's work, claims that Berger's contribution
to sociology has remained at an elementary level and that there is not
much that is new to be found there (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter,
Bergesen, and Kurzwei!, 1984, pp. 72 - 73).

Berger does, as mentioned above, feel that he has made his theoretical
position and methodology obvious to all.

One aspect of this, though, which I have always tsken seriously is
the obligation to make clear my methodology to others and to myself
(and here, I think I must disagree with Ainlay's assertion that I have
failed to indicate a methodology for sociology). I have tried to be clear
about my modus operandi from the beginning and, in collaboration
with Hansfried Kellner, restated my methodological presuppositions
in Sociology Reinterpreted. These presuppositions have remained

Weberian throughout and they are likely to remain so. If I have not
writtan more extensively on these matters, it is because I always felt
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that I had nothing very original to contribute here. (Berger, in
Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 224).

Berger has pursued his own intellectual agenda; one which he acknowledges
has located him within a 'cogoitive minority' (supra uide, p. 76). That Berger
is located within this, so called, cognitive minority would seem to highlight
and suggest more about the prejudices of those who judge his work, than the
worth of Berger's work itself.

Berger's eclectic synthesis of much social theory re-captures something of
the vision of classical sociology, and the substantive issues which it, as an

academic discipline, sought to address. Berger's eclectic approach combines
the works of such sociological 'greats' as Weber, Durkheim, and Marx.
(Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 3).
I

Berger's method appears to be very eclectic in its origins. He
borrows his anthropological presuppositions and dialectical method
from Marx, and his social psychology from Mead. His view of the
nature of social reality as coercive and constraining depends a good
deal on Durkheim, although he follows Weber in emphasizing the
construction of social reality through subjective meanings.
(Abercrombie, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 16).

This eclectic synthesis achieved by Berger enables him to provide a unique
analysis and perception of modern society. The sheer accessibility of
Berger's work is unique too in that Berger's methodology compels him to
address issues of 'proto-typical' human concern, and to write about these
concerns cleal"!y, fluently, and, at times, humorously. Whilst being eclectic
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Berger will, nonetheless, stand as a unique contributor to the understanding
and analysis of cultural issues in contemporary society.

The influence of Berger's methodology (inductive, empirical,
phenomenological, and Existential) enables Berger to provide a unique
overview of the affects of modernity upon society. Berger is concerned to
address substantive and interpretive issues and aspects of sociology, but
because of his eclecticism is often deemed to be 'light weight' in his analysis.
However, Berger's eclecticism, which is seen to be a weakness in the

sociological establishment's eyes, is actually one of his great strengths.

Berger frames these substantive and interpretive issues and aspects of
sociology which he deals with (modernity, secularization, pluralism, religion,
politics, and so on) within existing frames of reference. Berger draws on
many sources to achieve his unique interpretive perspective (sources such

as Neo·Orthodoxy, humanism, Existentialism, phenomenology, the

sociology of knowledge, and the history of ideas). These sources enable
Berger to conduct an ongoing dialogue with contemporary society, and the
,.

influences affecting it. Indeed, the depth and breadth of Berger's reading
makes him a formidable scholar and a person ofletters.

Perhaps Berger's eclecticism may, in part, be explained by the fact that his
.· "meta-scientific presuppositions ... have religious rather than philosophical
roots.• (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 223). And that, because of
this, he has remained "in the antechamber rather than the inner
sanctuary" of philosophical discussions "because I always felt that I had
nothing very original to contribute here." (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay,
1986, pp. 223 • 224). With reference to Berger's eclecticism Beckford
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maintains that

The influence of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, no less than that of
these philosophers' intellectual heirs, Max Weber and Alfred Schutz,
is apparent in Berger and Luck:mann's orientation towards the
meaning of modernity as it is generated in social interaction and
experienced in the consciousness. This phenomenological turn of
German social thought is blended with some of Marx's insights into
the dynamics of conflict and competition between social classes. And,
particularly in Luckmann's perspective on religion, extensive use is

made of Durkheim's understanding of the suigeneris nature of social
reality. The mixture of intellectual sources is completed with G. H.
Mead's social psychological appreciation of the social process of selfand identity-formation. The result of this admixture of such diverse
theoretical ideas is an unquestionably innovative synthesis.
(Beckford, 1989, pp. 87 - 88).

It is with this understanding of society, and the forces which shape and

affect it, that Berger seeks to locate religion as still having relevance, even
given the secularized and pluralistic situation in contemporary society,
within Western society. To achieve this, Berger relies upon

an 'inductive' model of theologizing, as opposed to a 'reductive' and
deductive model. That is, he starts his religious analyses with very
concrete, everyday life experiences, such as anxiety, humour, and

laughter, love, hope, play, etc. In them he searches for signals of
, transcendence (that is, for clear indications of a reality which goes
beyond the immediate here-and-now and which transcends our
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physical senses and the limits of our clock-time). Such signals of
transcendence are indeed the angels of our time, harbingers of a
supernatural reality. He thus tries to open our eyes for an inductive
type of religion which, if systematized theoretically, would lead to an
inductive type of theology. (Zijderveld, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986,
p. 74).

Needless to say, there are those who remain unconvinced by Berger's
analysis of the place of religion in contemporary society, and who also reject
his notion of the signals of transcendence in so far that "During the course
of modernization, we have eaten from a tree of knowledge, and thereby lost
a paradise of faith in redemption and salvation. The true tragedy of

modernization in this respect is that no deduction, no reduction and no
induction can ever put the canopy of Meaning together again." (Zijderveld, in
Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 75).

Given Zijderveld's comments (and those of others too) Berger, nonetheless,
maintains that belief is possible in the contemporary setting. Berger claims
this, not because of some aprioristic insight of his but, because he believes
it to be consistent with the lived experience of humanity; and that it is not
reliant upon any pre-conceived theological or philosophical conceptions.
Berger uses a similar line of argument here to the one he used regarding
freedom in his previous book Invitation to Sociology (1963) (supra vide, pp.

23, 39 • 40).

God has not made it easy for human beings to believe, and the

world provides good grounds for unbelief. I would prefer to pair belief
with another, very conventional term· namely, krwwl.edge. Some
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things I know, and some things I believe; generally speaking I don't
have to believe what I know. Thus I know that 2 + 2 = 4. It makes
, , little sense to say that I believe this. But if I have before me a closed
box containing apples, I may say that I believe it contains four; rm
not sure, but I have some reason to think that this is the number. In
conventional usage, there is a stronger use of the word ~ as when I

say that I believe in democracy, or in the integrity of my friend. Here
too is a statement about something I don't know, but my belief is
something stronger than a probability statement. It is an act that
commits me and in which I invest something important, possibly
that which is most important. In ordinary usage, of course, it is only
this second type of belief that would be graced with the term "faith."
(Berger, 1992, pp. 123 -124).

Berger is content to admit that he does not have all the answers to the
ontological questions which surround human existence. Silence in the face of
this 'unknowing' is, in Berger's opinion, the most appropriate action.

(Berger, 1967, p. 185; Berger, 1992, pp. 216 - 218).
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Berger's DiscJ!§Sion of Secularization and Pluralis,n:

Berger seeks to provide a via media between exclusivist religious positions
on the one hand and secular relativists on the other. Berger sees the real
challenge of modern pluralism being to insist (against the relativists) that
there are truth claims involved in religious propositions, without at the
same time arrogantly asserting (in the manner of the exclusivists) that
one's own is the only path to religious truth. (Berger, 1992, pp. 75 - 77).

It is not easy to live with pluralism. Democracy, both as an ideal
and as a set of institutions, makes it easier in terms of practical,

political arrangements, but it offers no help in coming to terms with
the underlying existential problem. Taking a philosophical view of the
matter, the challenge of modern pluralism to religion can be easily
stated: It is a challenge to hold convictions without either dissolving
them into utter relativity or encasing them in the false absolutes or
fanaticism. (Berger, 1992, p. 46).

For Berger it is truth which really matters, not the particular form in which
it may happen to be expressed. "I am not finally troubled by the impact of
cultural pluralism. The pluralizing forces ofmodernitydo indeed relativize
all belief systems, but the truth will come out again and again. Truth resists
relatiuization." (Berger, 1992, p. 77). The breakdown ofthe-world-taken-for-

granted evident in the pluralism of contemporary society opens up the
opportunity for the "individual in quest of religious truth to make something
of a fresh start." (Berger, 1992, p. 127). Whereas previously Berger claimed
that secula,;..zation was the most profound effect of modernity upon society
(Berger, 1967, p. 105 If.), and that pluralism was a side effect, or 'twin
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phenomenon' (Berger, 1969, p. 17) of secularization (Berger and Luckmann,
1966, p. 125), Berger now sees pluralism (and pluralization) as being the
most significant effect of modernity upon society. (Berger, 1992, pp. 63 •
78).

The one overriding fact to consider - a fact t.hat has become one of
the truisms of the age, but which is true nonetheless· is that of
cultural pluralism. The situation can be easily described: Through
most of history, most human beings found themselves in a lifelong,
single, highly int.egrated cultural environment; by contrast, today
most human beings in the world - and the great majority in advanced
industrial societies - constantly encounter foreign cultures, either by
actual contact with representatives of those cultures or through
various information media. The basic causes of this are aiso easily
discerned, especially scientifically based technology, which has
created an industrial economy, as well as the means of rapid
transport and instantaneous communication that increasingly unify
the globe. These powerful forces are at work worldwide, although
obviously they are most powerful in the societies with the highest
technological sophistication.... Pluralism also impinges on human
consciousness, on what takes place within our minds. This internal,
subjective process is what I have called 'pluralization.' Cultural
plurality is experienced by the individual, not just as something
external - all those people he bumps into - but as an internal reality,
a set of options present in his mind. In other words, the different
cultures he encounters in his social environment are transformed
into alternative scenarios, options, for his own life. (Berger, 1992, pp.
66 • 67).
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Given that • Modernity is a gigantic movement from fate to choice in the

human condition." (Berger, 1992, p. 89), and that humans are "compelled to
choose." (Berger, 1992, p. 89); Berger regards the pluralistic situation as a

positive, rather than a negative, situation. This pluralistic situation was
ushered in through the shift in the mind-set of the Western world borne by
Descartes' maxim 'Cogito ergo sum,' and the ever increasingindividualism

which this maxim heralded in. In such a situation the individual is no longer
defined by the clan or tribe. Rather the individual is able to choose who they
will be. There is a greater freedom involved in this choice, and Berger
maintains that "Only an individual with such a degree of freedom can be

said to 'believe' at all. And again: Freedom presupposes solitariness. Thus it is
only the solitary individual who can engage in an act of believing." (Berger,
1992, p. 87). However, there is an 'escape from freedom' when individuals
look for their definition of self in such group factors as 'nation' or in
totalitarianism; where the ind.tvidual is defined bybelonging to the group.

Berger is obviously addressing the reality of contemporary, industrialized,
Western society. He is not denigrating traditional societies where there is a
greater congruency between the 'self and the 'group.' Berger is concerned to
look for 'rumours' and 'hint.a' of transcendence in modern society given the
breakdown of taken-for-granted structures in that society. Consistent with
his argument in A Rumour of Angels, Berger holds that the breakdown of
the taken-for-granted structures enables transcendence to become visible.
(Berger, 1992, p. 127).

Berger highlights the important consequences of pluralism on
contemporary society, and upon any theologizing which can occur given the
implications of pluralism. Again, Berger takes a positive app1·oach to the
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development of this pluralistic situation for the individual believer, seeing it
as the opportunity for the individual t.o choose an authentic existence. The
affect of plurality upon the church though is a threat to its cla;m to
f

exclusive truth. This has led to a deinstitutionalization ofreligious belief.

Beckford maintains that

This is all congruent with Berger's depiction of secularization as 'the
process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the
dominationofreligiousinstitutionsand symbols' (1967, p. 107) and
as the production of increasing numbers of people 'who look upon the
world and their own lives without the benefit of religious
interpretations' (1967, p. 108). Berger held that the problem of
meaninglessness was intimately related to the effects of
seculadzation on the level of social structures and consciousness ·
;;.

alike. (Beckford, 1989, pp. 89 - 90).

Berger seems to take a far less anguished attitude towards modernity in his
latest work A Far Glory (1992). This would seem to be, in part, due to the
change in emphasis in his work from the effects of secularization upon,
contemporary society, to the effects of plurality and pluralization upon
contemporary society and within the consciousness of those who inhabit
that world. The pluralistic situation evident in contemporary society is one
which, for Berger, enables truth to reappear for "Truth resists

relativization." (Berger, 1992, p. 77). This attitude perhaps aligns Berger

.

more closely with his friend, fellow sociologist, and former co,:anthor,
· Thomas Luckmann. Luckmann has argued that "religion is a structural as
well as a cultural feature of all societies and that its 'invisible' functions are ·
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no less important for not being empirically available for observation and
measurement." (Beckford, 1989, p. 102). These 'invisible' factors associated
with religion, in Luckmann's opinion, include the increasingly private nature
of religious conviction and expression centering on such themes as self~

actualization, family, and nationalism. (Luckmann, 1967). Luckmann
maintains that inrlividuals need frameworks and systems of thought
through which they can interpret their various experiences of life, and which
enable them to make decisions about living. These frameworks and
· systems usually involve reference to ideas and concepts which stretch
beyond anything an individual can see. In order to integrate one's
experiences, Ludemann says, individuals refer to o:r use 'systems of

meaning.' These systems of meaning run like a thread through the various
sectors of a person's life, giving it coherence. Until relatively recently, there
was, to a large extent, throughout the Western world, one 'system of
meaning' which permeated every aspect of life. The Christian religion was
the dominant source of this integrating system. It described the nature of
the world and the nature of realit>.1 itself, and prescribed how one should live
both in society and in one's personal life. In contemporary Western culture,
the Christian 'world-view' no longer has a monopoly. To some extent,
everyone has the opportunity of choosing their own systems of meaning
and deciding for themselves what will have ultimate significance for them at least in the private spheres of life. The public world has its own
particular values and ways of operating which are built around economic
factors, efficiency, productivity, and orderly management. In the private

world, individuaJs can choose their own 'world-views' and values, and these
systems are seen as personal and private. (Luckmann, 1967).

Berger is alw,iys at pains not to overstate his theological position regardhg.
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the possibility of apprehending the supernatural (Berger's 'signals of

transcendence' as he outlined in his book: A Rumour of Aggels; supra vide,
pp. 74 -88) through empirical phenomena. For Berger

Imputing transcendence to these 'gestures' .is in itself an act of faith.
The theological procedure advocated in that book is 'inductive,' not in
the sense of modern scientific method, but in the sense of taking
ordinary human experience as its starting point... Using more
conventional Christian language, I might say that my approach is

'sacramental'~ an apprehension of God's presence 'in, with am1. under
the elements of common human experience - though this usage
might invite yet other misunderstandings. (Berger, in Hunter and
Ainlay, 1986, pp. 231 - 232).

Berger, in A Far Glory, seems to share Luckmann's opinion regarding the
positive merits ,if plurality, for the pluralism of contemporary society opens
up the opportunity for the "individual in ques't. of religious truth to make
something of a fresh start." (Berger, 1992, p. 127). It would seem that, for
Berger, there is now 'The Problem ofEcclesial Bewnging .' (Berger, 1992, pp.
169 - 190). This problem of ecclesial belonging comes about, in part,
through the above mentioned processes of rationalization, secularization

,,

and pluralization. More particularly, however, this problem is a result of the
cUITent state of the Christian denominations themselves. Here, Berger
draws upon such antecedents as Kierkegaard who held Christendom in
contempt, and Barth who considered that the church was always where
God's judgement (or 'krisis') particularly applied and who was also influenced
by the writings of Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer who did not see the 'world' as
being evil but that it was here, in the reality of the world, that the reality of

'
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God was realized. Berger is willing to concede that the institution of the
church at least fulfils the sociological functions of
providing a frame of reference so as to make the tradition available

·,.-

to all
. •,

No miracles for us, no angels, no transfigurations;just a glimmering
of transcendence in a transitory and usually solitary experience of
wonder, a remem'bered sunset or a redeeming smile, or a long ago
moment in church, or a passage in something once read. Needless to
say, such experiences are much more fugitive and effervescent than

the mighty visitations experienced by a Paul or a Teresa. To make
sense of them, literally to be able to remember them, we require a
frame of reference that typically derives from the institutionalized
tradition in which we are rooted (by birth or a later event). (Berger,
1992, pp. 171 -172);

and providing a plausibility structure for religious beliefs

')

In this, once more, religion is not unique; every belief requires such

social support. One can only say that religion is particularly in need
ofit because of the extra-urdinary and (for most people) metaempirical character of its affirmations .... I have never seen the gods;
if I am to affirm my belief in them, I very much need social support
for this beliof. (Berger, 1992, p. 172).
However, Berger goes on to say '·that "religious institutions not only
preserve, hand on, and make plausible a particular religious experience;
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they also, as it were, domesticate it." (Berger, 1992, p. 173). The question
this raises for Berger is "Why belong at all?" For Berger
"Denominationalism has created an etiquetre of considerable insipidness"

(Berger, 1992, p. 180) on the one hand; and on the other an unbelievable
fanaticism. "It seems to me one of the great challenges of the pluralist
situation to find a way of religious existence that rejects both these
alternatives." (Berger, 1992, p. 181).

Because of Berger's unpreparedness to assent to either extreme of

exclusivist religious positions on the one hand and the secular relativists on
:, the other, Berger sees himself as something of a 'lone believer' (Berger,

1992, pp. 81-104), and as belonging to a 'cognitive minority' (Berger, 1967,
pp. 184 - 185; Berger, 1969, pp. 6 - 7). This is consistent with his analysis of
the deinstitutionalization of meaning, and the demonopolization of religious
traditions within modem society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 81; supra
vide, pp. 48 - 49).

There is no authoritative answer that applies to everyone. Again
using traditional Protestant language, one might say that ecclesial
belonging is a matter of "vocation," of what one may singularly be
call.ed upon to do. Vocations differ. It may be a legitimate Christian
vocation to continue in one's original community, even if that

community has become a very unappealing place. It may be equally
legitimate to change one's ecclesial affiliation in a direction that
promises less frustration. One may be called to inner emigration and
one may also be called (as Simone Weil eloquently argued for herself)
'"

to the role of a solitary outsider. Vocations are relative by definition.
This relativization does indeed have a peculiar, perhaps disturbing
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affinity with the sociological realities of modern pluralism. (Berger,
1992, p. 190).
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The ever present pluritlism of modern societies (moral, sexual, religious, and
cultural) does present important theological challenges. Berger may not
have all the answers, but he sees the questions more clearly than most.
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Berger's Ethical agd Political Position:

With respect to the spheres of ethics and politics within contemporary
society Berger applies the same balanct\d outlook to such concerns as he
does with respect to religion in contemporary society. Berger's sociological

concern (which is coloured, as mentioned above, by his theological concern;

particularly as influenced by Bonhoeffer) is to create a tolerant and even
compassionate society (Berger, 1963, pp. 183 - 185). This concern for
humanity led Berger to become interested in such political concerns as
Third World development and modernization (Berger, 1969, pp. x - xi). Here
again it is possible to detect the influence of Bonhoeffer upon Berger as
issues of religion in contemporary society impinge upon political concerns.

That is, to borrow from Bonhoeffer's terminology, whilst being concerned
witb 'ultimate' reality, Berger is compelled to address issues of'penultimate'
reality for this is the reality of everyday life.

Just as Berger is content to respect any religious system which values

humanity and gives to Ls adherents the freedom to choose and to debate
issues within tbat tradition, and also to enter into dialogue witb other
traditions so that "Such dialogue becomes a common journey toward truth."
(Berger, 1992, p. 77). So also is Berger content to respect political and
ethical systems which respect the rights of the individual. Berger is
concerned to see tbat justice be done, and tbat justice be seen to be done
(Berger, 1992, pp. 209 • 211). It is this pragmatic way of seeing reality
which led Mechling to refer to Berger as 'The Jamesian Berger.' (Mechling,
in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 197 • 220). Berger, whilst not being thrilled
by this categorization (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 233 • 234),

does nonetheless agree with O'Leary (O'Leary, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986,
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pp. 179 - 196) that there is a very real, and pragmatic, relationship
between his (that is, Berger's) sociology of knowledge and politics.

I believe that he is correct in seeing the notion of'cognitive respect'

as a crucial link between the two spheres. Within the frame of
reference of the sociology of knowledge, and indeed of sociology in
general, 'cognitive respect' means that one takes with utmost

seriousness the meanings held by living human beings in any given
situation. This, again, is what Vers"tehen is all about; of course, this is

a methodological, not a moral, principle. It links up, though, with a
particular stance in politics. It is conservative, at least in the
(Burkean) sense of respecting the common values and traditions of
people, and of rejecting all notions of'raising the consciousness' of

people or of otherwise pretending to know better than they what is
good for them. This conservatism, of course, also predisposes one

toward democracy as a form of government and toward the market
economy. This notion of'cognitive respect' is a unifying thread in my
work on development strategies, on 'mediating structures' and on
human rights. It is also at the root of my criticisms of socialism and
of the pretensions of intellectuals, the 'New Class' and other putative
'vanguards of the people.' (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p.
233).

Berger owes, in part, a debt to Kant with respect to the relation between
politics and religion. This entails a demarcation between purely
authoritative assertions of God in the spirit of dialectical theology, and the
purely rational proof of God in the spirit of natural theology. Therefore there
is reference made, not to theoretical orthodoxy, hut to practical
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(orthopraxis) knowledge of God, manifested in one's actions; in a similar way
to Kant's categorica! imperative

Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold

good as a principle of universal legislation.

God is then understood as the condition for the possibility of humanity's
moral autonomy. So that for Kant and others the Enlightenment became
the liberation from self-imposed tutelage; and therefore the legitimation of
the questioning of (any) authority. This might be represented schematically
in a simple way as follows:

PRE - ENI.IGHTENMENT :

ignorance, intolerance, parochialism

POST - ENLIGHTENMENT :

democracy, liberalism, nationalism

(as opposed to tutelage to colonial powers, or religious authorities).

The pragmatic Berger has a preference for the Western democratic system
simply because he believes that it works
If one believes in the rights of the individual, then 'one must believe

in the superiority of the Western legal system that has uniquely
institutionalized these rights. Ifone holds a moral preference for
people having enough to eat as against people starving, then one
must deem Western-derived capitalism a superior way of arranging
the economy. None of these positions preclude criticisms of one's own
society and of its institutions any more than they preclude respect
for other cultures; but they presuppose that one's experience has
yielded some measure of truth. This is why the ch.rrge of "cultural
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imperialism" is often facile: Any affirmation of truth is "imperialistic"
since it must presuppose its superiority over the corresponding
.I

affirmation of error. (Berger, 1992, pp. 71 - 72).

Here Berger finds himself in a bind. Berger's analysis of modernity concerns
itself with some central concepts and propositions, such as:

Modernization -Though oriented and perhaps even inspired by
classical social theory, Berger approaches the relation between
culture and social change from a unique angle, one derived from the
sociology of knowledge. His pre-eminent concern is with the effects
of modernization upon human consciousness. (Wuthnow, in

Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 54 - 55;
Beckford, 1989, pp. 89 -

90);

Technology - Technology, bureaucracy and pluralism, then, are the
dominant institutional features of modernity. All, Berger maintains,
have distinct effects on human consciousness. (Wuthnow, in

Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, andKurzweil, 1984, p. 56);

Bureaucracy - Bureaucracy... has distinct consequences for the

world view of modernity. Among these are the perceptions that
society is organizable and manageable as a system, that the various
elements of experience are capable of being ordered into a taxonomic
structure where the affairs of daily life are to be carried out in a
regular and predictable fashion, that human rights are related to
bureaucratically identifiable rights. (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter,
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 56);
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Functional Rationality • Underlying both technological production
and bureaucratic organization and thus also carried over into the
totality of experience is a basic functional rationality. This is not an
intellectualization of the world but rather 'the imposition of rational
controls over the material universe, over social relations and finally

over the self' (1973: 202). (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter,
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 57); and

Pluralism· Pluralism, as Berger contends, manifests itself in
several ways in modern societies. Its most important form is socio-

cultural pluralism· the pluralism of symbolic universes where
values, morality, and belief systems of a sometimes very different
character are placed in a position of having to co-exist. Historically,
this kind of pluralism was carried by urbanization, but at present it
is also carried by mass communications and public education.
(Wutbnow, in Wuthnow ,Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p.
57).

Furthermore, Berger rejects any Marxist or neo-Marxist theories of Third
World underdevelopment, simply because he believes this analysis to be
empirically false.

Thus most Liberation Theologians believe that Third World
underdevelopment is caused by capitalism; that the Third World is
poor because the First World is rich· that is, our wealth depends on
their poverty; and, most important in terms of political implication,
that socialism is the way out of Third World poverty. It is my opinion,
based not on some ethical theorizing but on the reading of the
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evidence, that every one of these bP.!iefs is empirically false. (Berger,
1969, p. 152).

This, then, is Berger's bind; he believes, because of empirical experience,

that capitalism is a 'morally safer bet' (Berger, 1986, p. 12) than Marxist
political systems. That economic rationality, as displayed by capitalism, is
one of the major causes of the disintegration of traditional societies, which
Berger is aware of, leaves Bergey having to assert a 'hardnosed utopianism,'

which, in the final analysis, as Berger admits, fails.

Berger (1986) later acknowledged that this attempt to have the
best of both worlds ('hardnosed utopianism') was a failure. The even·
handed approach therefore yielded to a one-sided debunking of
socialism and an equally partial eulogy of the benefits of development
in the capitalist mode. The ethical dilemmas associated with Third
World development are not so confidently resolved, but capitalism is
described as on balance 'the morally safer bet' (1986, p. 12).
(Beckford, 1989, pp. 94 - 95).

Berger's humanistic concern compels him to maintain that 'penultimate'
events find "their ultimate significance ... in a reality that transcends them

and that transcends the empirical coordinates of human existence."
(Berger, 1969, p. 181). Again, it is immediately apparent the great influence
which Bonhoeffer has had upon Berger. (supra vide, pp. 19 • 20). The moral
and political issues of modern society, which were of such grave concern for
Bonhoeffer, must also be confronted in Berger's opinion, for the religious
perspective is one which values and cares for the human. (Berger, 1969, p.
181). Truth, for Berger, is essentially a religious concept. (Berger, 1969, p.
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182). And only by honestly searching for truth and justice will "the
redeeming gestures of love, hope~ and compassion ... [be] reiterated in

human experience." (Berger, 1969, p. 106).
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Berger's Discussion of Religious Meaning antl Modernity:

Having expk,rad some of the issues which stem from Berger's analysis of
moder.nity, it &ow remains to examine the central problem of this thesis
(apart from the purpose of providing an overview an~ examination of

Berger's thought), namely: In spite of the collapse of traditional theodicies
Berger maintains that religion still has a place to play in human culture.
'l'his thesis describes and outlines the ways in which Berger explores what
aspects of religious meaning are compatible with modernity. This is the
problem oflegitimating a theodicy in Post-Enlightenment society.

Berger's claim that "Men are congenitslly compelled to impose a meaningful
order upon reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 22) highlights the need people have for
a meaningful existence. However

secularization frustrates deeply grounded human aspirations most important among these, the aspiration to exist in a meaningful

and ultimately hopeful cosmos ... There are, of course, secular
'theodicies,' and they clearly work for some people. It appears,
however, that they are much weaker than the religious 'theodicies' in
offering both meaning and consolation to individuals in pain, sorrow
and doubt. (Berger, 1977, p. 79).

For "It is not happiness that theodicy primarily provides, but meaning."
(Berger, 1967, p. 58). This meaning is required by society, and individuals
within society, by virtue of the anomic forces which disrupt, or even
destroy, the established order.
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So as to legitimate a meaningful, contemporary theodicy Berger suggests
various signals of transcendence which are "phenomena that are to be
found within the domain of our 'natural' reality but that appear to point
beyond thatreality."(Berger, 1969, p. 59;supravide, pp. 74-88).

Berger, in bis latest work (A Far Glory), says this about the signals of
transcendence

I have long thought that the signals we can find in ordinary,
everyday life are of decisive importance: The recurring urge of human
beings to find meaningful order in the world, from the overarching

edifices constructed by great minds to the assurance that a mother
gives her frightened child; the redemptive experiences of play and
humour; the ineradicable capacity to hope; the overwhelming
conviction that certain deeds of inhumanity merit absolute
condemnation, and the contrary conviction as to the absolute
goodness of certain actions of humanity; the sometimes searing
experience of beauty, be it in nature or the works of man; and many

others one could easily enumerate. Each of these, though quite
ordinary in many case'3 and almost never perceived as supernatural,

point toward a reality that lies beyond the ordinary: The order my

mind imposes on the world intends an order that was there before my
mind began to work on it. If my game or my joke can temporarily
supersede the tragic dimensions of the human condition, I can
envisage the possibility that tragedy is not necessarily the last or
most important thing one can say about that condition. If I can hope
even in the face of death, then I can at least entertain the thought
that death may not be the last word about my life. And so on.
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These experiences clearly do not unambiguously or compellingly
testify to transcendence. Each of them can be amply explained in
secular terms that bracket or exclude transcendence. Order may
indeed be the product of human minds, illld nothing else; outthere,in
the end, may be nothing but meaningless chance or chaos. My
playing and my joking may be useful ways to escape for a few
moments from the tragedy of being a vulnerable and mortal being,
but in the end, the joke may be on me. I may hope all I want, but all
my hopes will finally be dashed not only by my own death but by the
eventual destruction of everyone and everything in whom or in which
I have invested hope. To see in these experiences signposts toward

transcendence, therefore, is in itself a decision of faith. There must be
no illusion about this, no manoeuvre to bring in the hoary proofs for
the existence of God by the back do01. But the faith in these signals
is not baseless, nor is it a mental ac"tegratuit. It takes my own

experience seriously and dares to suppose that what this experience
intends is not a lie. (Berger, 1992, pp. 139 • 140).

As mentioned previously (supra uide, p. 69), the construction of meaning in

contemporary society needs an ability to cope with complexity, it needs to
be reasonable, as well as contemporary (to cope with tlie plurality in
modem society), and it is on the way (that is, not given to closure).
Therefore any contemporary theodicy, or system of meaning, must be able
to be historically concerned (that is, conscious of its origins and open to the
future), empirical (that is, open to scrutiny and review), inductive (that is,
dealing with concrete reality, not abstract thc-ory), and concerned with
people's lived experience. The signals of transcendence allow for the
legitimation of this private, deinstitutionalized religion; that is, they
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legitimate a mearungful theodicy for contemporary humanity. T, ,is
theodicy, which is able to accommodate the wider view current in modern
society provided by the ecological movement, interaction between the
various religious traditions, the feminist movement, t.'ie reality of multiculturalism, and the resulting pluralism from the above factol'S, can provide
some basis for a meaningful and authentic existence in contemporary

society. The signals of transcendence are able to correlate people's lived
experience (theil' 'natw-al reality') to a reality which is "in, with and under"
that natural reality (Berger, 1992, p. 155; supravide, pp. 81, 86 - 87). The
influence of Bonhoeffer, who debunked the notion of there being two
separate realities in existence (one divine, the other worldly), on Berger is
again apparent. (supra vide, pp. 19 - 20).

Berger's contribution to sociology, and to the sociology of religion in
particular, involves an innovative methodological synthesis which enables
Berg,,r to utilize the sociology of religion in a way which addresses the
situation in contemporary Western society (Beckford, 1989, pp. 170 -172).

To effectively address the place of religion in contemporary society, as
outlined by Beckford, Berger utilizes an ~nductive' theological methodology
whereby human experience 'correlates' with another reality; namely, a
supernatural reality. This inductive process of 'correlation' is seen by

Berger to be reasonable (Berger, 1992, p. 155; Berger, 1969, p. 53).
However

Nothing that has been said here makes the crisis brought on by
moral pluralism disappear. Just as religious certainty is hard to
come by in the pluralistic age, so is moral certainty... In the earlier
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discussion of religious experience I emphasized the element of trust trust, that is, in my own experience ... What I must tlc then is
undertake the previously mentioned prise de conscience - to recollect
what I know, and have faith that what I know is truth. This is not a
formula for immunity against the corrosive effects of relativity. If
relativity is a stormy sea of uncertainties, this faith does not
magically make the waters recede so that we can march through
them on a dry path. What it does do is give us courage to set sail on
om· little boat, with the hope that, by God's grace, we will reach the
other shore without drowning. (Berger, 1992, p. 211).

In the final analysis, for Berger

The choice is finally between a closed world or a world with windows
on transcendence. It goes without saying that the latter is more
hopeful. However, this does not make it less reasonable:
Hopelessness does not have a superior epistemological status.
Indeed, one might say that, philosophically, it is more reasonable to
hope than to despair. (Berger, 1992, p. 142).

This, then, is the role which Berger's signals of transcendence serve: to

provide hope in life, trust in one's experience and in the future, and courage
to live a full and authentic existence. As such Berger's signals of
transcendence do legitimate a theodicy which does provide meaning in PostEnlightenment society.
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CHAPTER V:CONCLUSION

Berger has written so much that any assessment of his work will suffer
from not being able to review all of his output. This thesis has sought to
provide an overview and examination of the central aspects of Berger's
'l',

enormous output. It is possible to detect an evolution in the development of
Berger's thought and work. One example of this is the W8Y in which Berger
has addressed many of the issues which were of concern to the Neo·
Orthodox Protestant theologians such as Barth and Bonhoeffer, having
been so strongly influenced by them at an early stage, and then moving
away from such a theological position because of his later sociological
convictions (1967, pp. 179 • 185; supra vide, pp. 16 • 22). The influence of
Bonhoeffer, particularly in the realms of ethics and politics, however,
remains a significant influence upon Berger to this day (supra vide, pp. 105
-111). Another example of the evolution of Berger's thought and work is in
the areas of secularization and pluralism (supra uide, pp. 96 - 104).

Berger's methodology enables him to address issues of 'proto·typical'
concern, the issues of everyday, lived existence. As discussed previously,

this ha.s led some to accuse Berger of methodological simplicity (supra vide,
pp. 90 • 95). This, however, is Berger's concern; that is, to address the
human situation as it is lived. Berger is vitally concerned with the lived
experience of humanity. His work is phenomenological and empirical "in the
sense that it is concerned with human experience in everyday life. Its task
is (most generally) to describe human experience as it is lived and not as it
is theorized about· to account for social reality from the point of view of the
actors involved." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil,

1984, p. 73).
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Berger is concerned with the phenomenon of everyday life and, apart from
his use of phenomenological methodology, offers a form of
philosophical/theological anthropology which is not only re.freshing in its
accessibility but also of profound significance with respect to the
implications it has for life and for the study of sociology, theology,
philosophy, history, and anthropology (Berger, 1969, pp. ix - x). Berger (and
Lucl,mann) provide an important re-evaluation of the sociology of
knowledge with respect to its understanding of the social construction of
reality. The issues they raise far exceed the boundaries of sociology alone
(they are concerned with all that passes as 'knowledge' within society) and,
as such, their work is of great historical (with its use of the history of ideas)
and philosophical (with its discussion of 'reality') importance too. Their
discussion of the relationship between objective and subjective aspects of
society reconciles previously contrary view poir,ts. This dialectic is central
to their understan<ling of society and of the place and role of humanity
within society. "The point is that society sets limits to the organism, as the
organism sets limits to society." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.182).
Whilst concerned at a theoretical level, it is, nonetheless, Berger and
Luckmann's intention that the se>ciology of knowledge be relevant to the
lived experience of humanity; and that it lead to a humanizing of sociological
theory.

This oqject is society as part of the human world, made by men,
inhabited by men, and, in turn, malting men, in an ongoing historical
process. It is not the least fruit of humanistic sociology that it
reawal<ens our wonder at this astonishing phenomenon. (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 189).
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For Berger, as a sociologist and a Christian, the choice of this methodology
has taken the form of a 'vocation,' (Berger, 1992, p. 190) in so far as he
achievP,S a congruency between his life, his profession, and the methodology
which he employs within that profession. Because of the methodology of his
approach Berger finds himself in a 'cognitive minority,' (Berger, 1967, pp.
184 • 185; Berger, 1.969, pp. 6 • 7; supra vide, pp. 76, 91, 103). Berger finds
himself in such a situation because he suggests that it is possible to hold a
socio-historical world-view consistent with the sociology of knowledge, and
also assent to the place of the supernatural within that world-view. Such a
person holding such a view is on the outside of socially legitimated views on
religion, society, and philosophy: religion, because of the way revelation is

central to 'orthodox' belief; society, because so many people within
contemporary society are dis-enfranchized with such an orthodox view of
religion in particular, and with organized religion in general; and philosophy,
because the prevailing intellectual 'orthodoxy' does not admit to the place of
the supernatural. It is into this unenviable situation that Berger sets forth
the place and validity of the supernatural within contemporary society.

Berger attempts to be entirely honest and not to overstate his theological
position regarding the possibility of apprehending the supernatural
(Berger's 'signals of transcendence' as he outlined in his book: A Rumour of
Angels; supra vide, pp. 74 • 88) through empirical phenomena. Berger is
content to admit that he does not have all the answers (s1<pra vide, p. 95).
Therefore, Berger is unable to provide an over-arching system of meaning in
the contemporary situation. This, however, is not a weakness or fault in his
work but, rathe,-, is an honest attempt to legitimate a theodicy which does
provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment society.
'·
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Rather than providing J!!l (or one) over-arching system of meaning, Berger
allows for choice to be made between varying and sometimes contradictory
systems of meaning (Berger, 1963, p. 68), so that meaning may be made
from the necessity of having to choose between systems of meaning, and
thereby the construction of meaning takes place (Berger, 1992, pp. 87 • 89;
supra vide, pp. 96 • 104). To achieve this Berger draws upon a wide range of

thinkers and disciplines in the formulation of his thought and work. Whilst
this creates an eclectic and, at times, repetitive approach (much of the
material in The Sacred Canopy is simply a re-working of material from The
Social Construction of Reality; which forms a large part of A Far Glory too)
to the material Berger examines, it remains to be said that the conclusions

which Berger reaches &.re independent of others and, as mentioned above,

whilst these conclusions have put Berger outside various intellectual
'orthodoxies,' he remains an innovative, creative, and astute commentator
on contemporary society.

Though Berger's thought and work are eclectic and, at times, repetitive, he
provides a refreshing analysis of contemporary society, and his suggestions
as to the construction of meaning in contemporary society does legitimate a
theodicy (or theodicies) which does provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment
society.
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GLOSSARY

Alienation • is the process whereby the dialectical relationship between the
individual and their world is lost to consciousness. The individual "forgets"
that this world was, and continues to be, co-produced by their actions.
(Berger, 1967, p. 85). That is, ol:!iectivation is reified.

Anomy (Anomie) - tbe absence of a nomos, or nomic order. The concept of
anomie was first developed by Durkheim (Suicide, 1951, Glencoe, Ill., Free

Press). Berger uses tbe Anglicized spelling. (Berger, 1967, p. 21).

Bureaucracy~ "Bureaucracy, carried by a large number of institutions in

contemporary society, but particularly by the modern state, also has
distinct consequences for tbe world view of modernity. Among these are tbe
perceptions that society is organizable and manageable as a system, that
the various elements of experience are capable of being ordered into a
taxonomic structure where the affait'S of daily life are to be c&rried out in a
regular and predictable fashion, that human rights are related to
bureaucratically identifiable rights. As with technological production, th.is
orientation is ori_ginally derived from the various encounters the individual
has with bureaucratic structures but is carried over into an overall

perception of the world." (Wutbnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and
Kurzweil, 1984, p. 56).

Cosmization -derived from Eliade (Cosmos and History, 1959, New York,
Harper, p. 10 ff.). The socially established nomos appears as a microcosmic
reflection of the universe.
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De-Institutionalization • pluralistic competition between truth claims of
various sub-universes of meaning may weaken the claims a universe of

meaning has to absolute 'Truth.' (Berger and Lucl<mann, 1966, p. 86).
Secularization and phiralism contribute to this situation.

Existentialism • despite the diversity, certain basic characteristics bearing
on philosophy and ethics are noteworthy. Existentialist literature offers
valuable phenomenological insight into the human condition. Stress has
been placed on

a) subjective individuality, or personal involvement, as distinguished from
being merely theoretical and detached, in making moral choices. Sartre
says, "existence precedes essence," subjectivity must be the starting point

for genuine understanding. This characteristic is thereforo set alongside
another

b) a strong opposition to 'systems' which, lil<e Hegel's, tend to fit human
existence into abstract or pre-conceived moulds. At its best Existentialism
urges each individual to discover for themselves what their own
'authenticity' as a person requires of them. It calls for setting aside the
rationalization of behaviour and mere conformity to the 'crowd.'

A third claim, made in its most dramatic form by the atheistic
Existentialists, is that

c) hum.an existence is basically absurd (Sartre, Camus); that humans have
been thrown into a world that lacks cosmic meaning (Heidegger).
Nietzsche's proclamation through Zarathustra of the death of God helped to
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mould this perspective. Life is not simply paradoxical, as in Kierkegaard's
view; life is absurd in the fundr.u.u~ntal sense that there are no rational,

theological, or philosophical categories for explaining it. Hu.mans rr.ust
accept the reality of their 'bei,~g-towards-death' (Heidegger) without
Kierkegaard's hope in God who meets the person who reaches out in faith
from their 'sickness unto death.'

The fourth, and basic, contention of Existentialism is that

d) each person possesses the inescapable freedom to choose, which ic the
fundamental fact of being human and the sin qun non for a qualitative
existence. All Existentialists agree that the quality of life is up to the
individual to determine.

Existentialism perhaps lends itself to extravagances, but in the bands of its
saner practitioners, these are avoided. Indeed, one might say that it saves

us from still wilder extravagances, and especially the extravagance of
trying to construct a philosophy without first scrutinizing in all its
accessible dimensions the locus in which all philosophizing takes place - our
own human experience and existence.

The 'Classical' world view held that fixed, immutable principles evidenced in
the world gave rise to eternal, unchanging principles. Whereas now the
modern world view gives credence to the lived E,nstential experience of the
moral agent; and the context in which that person lives out their life. This
historir.ally conscious world view avoids the traps into which the classical
world view fell by supposing that there is "an unchanging body of clearly
formulated precepts, based on a supposedly unchanging nature."
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(Macquarrie, 1977, p. 506).

Existential philosophers seek to gain philosophical perspective through
describing and evaluating the human condition. The fundamental claim of
Existentialism is that humans are only truly human to the extent that they
discover their own nature (essence) through decisive action (their
'existence'), as opposed to receiving some prescribed nature of existence.

Each person, so Existentialism contends, possesaes the inescapable

freedom to choose, which is the fundamental fad of being human and the
sin qua non for a qualitative existence. Existentialists assert that the

quality of life is up to the individual to determine.

A contemporary, historically conscious, world view must, of necessity, be

able to enter into dialogue with, and be relevant to, the world, and the issues
of that world, in which it finds itself. This contemporary world view takes
seriously the locus in which all meaning is constructed - our own human
experience and existence. That is, by using ar~ empirical, inductive method

which is concerned with historical particulars this world view takes
seriously the lived experience of humans. (Macquarrie, 1973; Macquarrie,
1980).

Externalization - the outpouring of human being into the world. (Berger,
1967, p. 4).

Functional Rationality - "Underlying both technological production and
bureaucratic organization and thus also carried over into the totality of
experience is a basic functional rationality. This is not an intellectualization
of the world but rather 'the imposition of rational controls over the material
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universe, over social relations and finally over the self' (1973: 202)."
(Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 57).

Hermeneutics - is the theory and method of interpreting meaningful human
action. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988, p. 112).

Humanism - a concern with humanity rather than with God or nature is the
central tenet of humanism. Humanist Marxist sociology is that which takes
humanity, rather than social structure, as its central focus. (Abercrombie,
Hill, and Turner, 1988, p. 116). For Berger, a humanistic perspective to
sociological inquiry is vital in that it enables freedom to he realized in
society. (Berger, 1963, p. 199; Berger, 1966, p. 189).

Ideology - when a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a
concrete power interest it may be called an ideology. (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 123).

Institutionalization - the collective externalization of society, which has
about it an objective reality (or givenness), as a result of the habitualized
actions and reciprocal typifications of society. ( Berger and Luckmann,
1966, pp. 53 - 54).

Internalization - the structures of the externaVobjective world are
transformed into structures of the subjective consciousness. (Berger, 1967,
p. 4).

Legitimation - the term legitimation is derived from Weber and refers to
socially ol\jectivated 'knowledge' that serves to explain and justify the social
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order. Put differently, legitimations are answers to any questions about the
'why' of institutional arrangements. Legitimations are mostly pre·

theoretical in character. (Berger, 1967, pp. 29 - 31).

Liberal Protestant Theology - developed into an anti-dogmatic and
humanitarian reconstruction of the Christian iaith. Liberalism, which came
into being in the Nineteenth Century, may be defined as the holding of
liberal opinions in politics or theology. F.D. Schleiermacher (1768 - 1834)
was a leading figure within Liberal Protestant theologians. Schleiermacher
defined religion as 'a sense and taste fo,- the infinite,' or as the feeling of
absolute dependence. He also contended that religion was based on intuition
and feeling and that it was ind.opendent of all dogma, he saw its highest
experience in a sensation of union with the infinite. Schleiermacher held
that the variety of forms which the feeling of absolute dependence takes in
different individuals and societies accounts for the diversity of religions, of
which Christianity is the highest, though not the only true one. (Cross and
Linngstone, 1984, pp. 821, 1243 -1244). Berger has a high regard for the
work of the Liberal Protestant theologians, and Schleiermacher in
particular. Berger uses a process of'induction' which "involves an attempt
to uncover and retrieve essential experiences embodied in the religious

tradition. It is both empirical and comparative, in that it takes all religious
experience seriously in its search for transcendent reality. Friedrich
Schleiermacher achieves paradigmatic status relative to this approuch."
(Gaede, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 170). Berger refers to the
:··'I

'Protestantization' of religious groups which is a result of the increasing
secularization and pluralism within modem society. Berger is , nonetheless,
an admirer of the honesty which Protestantism (particularly such
theologians as Schleiermacher) has maintained in its interaction with
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modernity. • It was Protestantism that first underwent the onslaught of
secularization; Protestantism that first adapted itself to societies in which
several faiths existed on equal terms, the pluralism that may be regarded
as a twin phenomenon of secularization, and it was Protestant theology
that the cognitive challenges to traditional supernaturalism were first met
and fought through." (Berger, 1969, p. 17).

It is in this tradition that Berger sets forth his thesis on the relevance of the
supernatural in contemporary society. Not in a spirit of accommodation or
7

reduction, or translation, but by developing an inductive theology ( or
theodicy, or system of meaning; Berger, 1969, p. 22).

Mru:ginal Situations - situations which drive a person close to or beyond the
boundaries of the order that determines their routine, everyday existence.
(Berger, 1967, p. 23).

Modernization - "Though oriented and perhaps even inspired by classical
social theory, Berger approaches the relation between culture and social
change from a unique angle, one derived from the sociology of knowledge.
His pre-eminent concern is with the effects of modernization upon human
consciousness. These effects, of course, are wide-ranging, influencing core

assumptions about everyday life, and experience of time and temporality,
the formation and experience of the self, the interpretation of symbolic
universe of meaning (religion in particular), and the nature of political
reality. Berger, in his characteristically sweeping and comprehensive
fashion, cO'vers all of these areas.

Of all his intellectual forbears, it is chiefly from Weber that Berger derives
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his orientation. As with Weber, the infrastructure of modernization is
rationality, especially as it is embodied in the economic and political
apparatus of society. In this he sharply distinguishes himself from Marxist
theory on the subject, a

theoretical perspective that explains the

peculiarity of modern institutions almost entirely in terms of the peculiarity
of modern capitalism. For Berger, functional rationality is the determining
variable in modern society, yet it is not simply a functional rationality
which spontaneously emerges and is diffused in society. Of principal

importance in the origin, evolution, and transmission of modernization is the
rationalized, indeed technologized, economy and its related institutions. Of
critical importance in the inner-dynamics of modernization are the
rationalized political institutions of society, particularly the modern
bureaucratic state." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and
Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 54 - 55).

Neo-Orthodoxy - a title applied to the theological principies of Karl Barth
and his followers (supra uide, pp. 16 - 22). Nee-Orthodoxy is also called
dialectical theology on the ground that, in distinction from the dogmatic
method of ecclee,iastical orthodP:.y, which treats God as a concrete Object

(uia dogmatica), and the negative principles of many mystics, which forbid
all positive affirnldtions about God (uia negativa), it finds the truth in a
dialectic ai;prehension of God which transcends the 'Yes' and the 'No' of the
other methods (uia dialectica). Its object is to preserve the Absolute of faith
from every formulation in cut-and-dried expressions. (Cross and
Livingstone, 1984, p. 399).

Nomization - the propensity for order in society, as opposed to anomy.
(Berger, 1969, pp. 60 - 64).
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Nomo~ - a meaningful order which is imposed upon the discrete experiences
andmeaningsofinilividuals. (Berger, 1967, p. 19).

Objectivation

~

the produ~t of externalization confronts its original

producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves. (Berger,
1967, p. 4).

Phenomenolo,,"l'. - provides a significant methodological tool for Berger.
Berger adopts (a..,d adapts) this methodology from the sociologist, Alfred
Schutz (1899 - 1959) who was concerned to explore the 'world-taken-forgranted'. This is the self evident world ofthe'here-and-now' which demands
one's immediate attention. (confer Schutz,A, tr. Walsh, G., and Lehnert, F.
[1967], The Phenomenology of the Social World, Ill.: Evanston). In the
sociology of knowledge, phenomenologists have concentrated on the way in
which commonsense knowledge about society feeds back, through social
action, into the moulding of society itself. (Bullock, Stallybrass, and
Trombley, 1988, p. 645). Phenomenology, as employed by Berger, requires
the 'brad<eting' of personal preferences and prejudices so as to be able to
investigate the "doings of men." (Berger, 1963, p. 29). Phenomenology refers
to the 'study of phenomena'; the study of what appears or what may be
observed (similar to Kant's 'Phenomena;' supra vide, p. 26). The use of
phenomenology requires that the investigator utilizes academic discipline
and imaginative empathy. This requires the investigator to make an
attempt to appropriate and understand what a particular phencmenon
might involve for those people who are directly engaged with it.
Phenomenology is a kind of thinking whi<;h guides the investigator back
from theoretical abstraction to the reality of the lived experience. A
phenomenologist asks the question "what is it like to have a certain
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experience?" In examining the qualities of the experience the investigator
can then arrive at the essence of the experience. The phenomenological
method is an inductive, descriptive research method. The task of the
method is to investigate and describe all phenomena, including the human
expe,rience, in the way these phenomena appear in their fullest breadth and
depth. To ensure that the phenomenon is investigated as it truly appears a
necessary criterion is that the researcher must approach the suluect and
the experience with an open mind, accepting whatever data are given with
no pre-conceived expectations. No data are ignored because of conflicts with
theoretical frameworks or operational definitions. The concern of the
phenomenological researcher is to understand both the cognitive subjective
perspective of the person who has the experience and the effect that
perspective has ou the lived experience of that individual. (Kentish, 1992,
pp. 42 • 48).

Pluralism· rival definitions of reality compete with each other for a share of
the 'market.' (Be -ger, 1967, pp. 135 · 137). "Pluralism, as Berger contends,
manifests itself in several ways in modern societies. Its most important

form ie. socio-cultural pluralism· the pluralism of symbolic universes where
valu,.!s, morality, and belief systems of a sometimes very different

character are placed in a position of having to co-exist. Historically, this
kind of pluralism was carried by urbanization, but at present it is also
carried by mass communications and public education." (Wuthnow, in

Wuthnow ,Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 57).

Pluralization • because of the cultural plurality involved in society where
pluralism occurs, members of that society are faced with cl,.oosing between
equally valid options for life (be they religious, philosophical, or 'life.style).
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This subjective process of choice in a pluralistic situation is called by Berger
'pluralization.' (Berger, 1992, p. 67). "Modernity is a gigantic movement from
fate to c/wice in the human condition." (Berger, 1992, p. 89). Humans are
"compelled to choose." (Berger, 1992, p. 89).

Poat-Enlightenment Society · is marked by an increasing secularization
(the process whereby sectors of society and culture are removed from the
domination of religious institutions and symbols; stemming from Rene
Descartes' [1596 · 1650] maxim "Cogito, ergo sum." ["I think, therefore I
run."], which displaced the prevalent theocentricism with a solidly based
anthropocentricism) and rationalism (stemming from Immanuel Kant's
[1724 -1804] distinction between 'Phenomena' and 'Noumena' ['things in
themselves']. Kant maintains that we cannot prove the noumenal, we can

only prove the phenomenal).

This increase in secularization and rationalism undermined the PreEnlightenment metaphysic with its traditional arguments for the existence
of God and the authority of the Church and the Bible (confer Chadwick,
1990).

Post-Modernism - society has moved from the pre • Enlightenment, to the
Enlightenment, to the Post - Enlightenment (modern), to the Post Modernist (where there is a dis-confirmation of all ideology, particularly
religious ideology [theodicy] due to the secularization of the European mind
[confer Chadwick, 1990]).

Post - Modernism may be seen as a retreat into irrationality; a coming to
terms with a world where God is dead (the modern metaphysic), and where
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the author is also dead. The Post· Modernist world view reflects the change
in world view from post • Newtonian physics (dealing with a closed,
predictable system I structure... a Post • Enlightenment view) to
Einsteinian physics (dealing with an open ended, unpredictable system I
structure ... the Post · Modernist view).

Post - Modernism resists closure, yet also affirms that we cannot live
without trying to make sense of reality (Marshall, 1992, pp. 192 - 3). Post Modernism gives up absolute Truths; instead it works with local and
provisional truths (Marshall, 1992, p. 3). Post · Modernism is empirical; it
does not have a transcendental identity (Marshall, 1992, p. 4). Post -

Modernism involves a critical questioning of power and values, but also
affirms the need for these (Marshall, 1992, pp. 4 - 5). Post · Modernism
involves "an incredulity toward metanarratives.' (Marshall, 1992, p. 6;
Ktlng, 1980, p. 504). "The post - Modernist movement resists totaJ;,ations,
absolute Identity, absolute Truths. It does, however, believe in the use value of identities and local and contingent truths.' (Marshall, 1992, p. 6).

Post- Modernism claims that words, ideas, creeds, and structures can
'

become idols (Marshall, 1992, p. 18 ); and that "the twentieth - century
Occidental subject ls still a mixture of the mediaeval 'I' believe; the
Cartesian 'r think; the Romantic 'I' feel; as well as the existential 'I' choose;
l
..-1

l

l

j

the Freudian 'I' dream, and so forth.' (Marohall, 1992, p. 86). Furthermore,
Post-Modernism maintains that history is not teleological, not linear, which
privileges both the 'origin' and the subject of consciousness who interprets,
and thus controls, the past from the perspective of the present. (Marshall,
1992, p. 157).

l
j

;l

Post - Modernism corresponds w Berger's notion of the 'public' and the
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l

]

I

I

'private' spheres. The public sphere is over· institutionalized (dealing as it
does with such 'social' concepts as sincerity and honour), whereas the
private sphere is under - (or de-) institutionalized (dealing as it does with
more personal concepts as authenticity and dignity; Berger and Luckmann,
1966, p. 81).

Eagleton maintains that the antecedents of modern secular society are:
science democracy, rationalism, and economic individualism; and that
7

religion has failed to provide a coherent nomos ("a coherent cement") given
the changes that have taken place within society since the late nineteenth
century (industrialism, scientific discovery, and social change). This gave
rise to the Romantic movement, and to the rise of English Literature (which
fills the emotional and experiential needs of people; that is, it provides a
coherent nomos, a socially constructed reality). (Eagleton, 1986, pp. 22 -23
ff.). For Post-Modernists it is language which produces meaning. (Eagleton,

1986, p. 60 ).
Projection • the concept of projection was first developed by Fauerbach.
Both Marx and Nietzsche derived it from Feuerbach. It was the
Nietzschean derivation that became important for Freud. Berger (and
Luclcm.ann) use the term 'externalization' to convey a similar concept.

(Berger, 1967, p. 180).
Reification - is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were
things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 89).

Religion - a human enterprise in so far as this is how it manifests itself as
an empirical phenomenon. Within this definition the question as to whether
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religion may also be something more than that remains bracketed, as, of
course, it must be in any attempt at scientific understanding. (Berger,
1967, p. 190). Therefore, religion is to be understood as a human projection,
grounded in specific infrastructures of human history. ( Berger, 1967, p.
180).

Secularization • the process by which sectors of society and culture are
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. (Berger,
1967, p. 107).

_Signals of Transcendence · are phenomena that are to be found within the
domain of our "natural" reality but that appear to point beyond that reality.
(Berger, 1969, p. 59). These signals of transcendence are constituted by
'prototypical human gestures,' which are certain reiterated acts and
experiences that appear to express essential aspects of humanities' being.
(Berger, 1969, p. 59).

Sociology • may be defined as the study of the bases of social membership.
More technically, sociology is the analysis of the structure of social
relationships as constituted by social interaction, but no definition is
entirely satisfactory because of the diversity of perspectives which is
characteristic of the modern discipline. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner,
1988, p. 232).

Significant contributions have been made to the discipline by
Karl Marx (1818 · 1883) • all social structure was class structure,
and the history of all societies was the history of class struggles. In his
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f.indamental methodology, Marx argued that social existence determines
consciousness (s.n important insight for the sociology of knowledge), and
that ideology ('ideas serving as weapons for social interests') is merely a

superstructure ('the world produced by human activity'), economic relations
being the substructure ('human activity'). (Bullock, Stallybrass, and
Trombley, 1988, p. 793; Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 5 • 6).

Max Weber (1864 • 1920) • held that sociology would concern itself
with the meaning of social action and ,he uniqueness of historical events
rather thllll with the fruitless search for general laws. (Abercrombie, Hill,
and Turner, 1988, p. 233); and

Emile Durkheim (1858 - 1917) • exhibited a far more confident view
of the achievements of sociology, claiming that it had shown how certain
moral and legal institutions and religious beliefs were the same in a wide
variety of societies, and that this uniformity was the best proof that the
social realm was subject to universal laws. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner,
1988, p. 233).

The synthesis ofDurkheimian (society as objective reality) and Weberian
(society as subjective reality) view points achieved by Berger allows for a
balance between the sociological reification of objective social reality and
the idealism of subjective meanings. "Society is a dialectic phenomenon in
that it is a human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet
continuously acts back upon its producer." (Berger, 1967, p. 3).

Sociology of Knowledge - "The need for a 'sociology of knowledge' is thus
already given with the observable differences between societies in terms of
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what is taken for grnnted as 'knowledge' in them." (Berger and luckmann,
1966, p. 3).

Whilst the term 'Sociology ofKnowledge' ('Wissenssoziologie') was coined by

the philosopher Max Scheler in the 1920's, Berger and Luckmann suggest
three other contributing factors in the development of the sociology of
knowledge. First is the work of Karl Marx from whom the sociology of
knowledge derives its root proposition "that man's consciousness is
determined by his social being." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 5). From
Marx comes also such concepts as 'ideology' - "ideas serving as weapons for
social interests."; 'false consciousness' - "thought that is alienated from the
real social being of the think.er."; 'substructure' - "human activity."; and

'superstructure' - "the world produced by that activity." (Berger and
Luckmann, 1966, p. 6). Second, "one can say that the sociology of
knowledge represents a specific application of what Nietzsche aptly called
the 'art of mistrust.m (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7). The third factor
Berger and Luckmann cite as being influential in the development of the
sociology of knowledge is the development of historicism in which the
"dominant theme here was an overarching sense of the relativity of all
perspectives on human events, that is, of the inevitable historicity of
human thought." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7).

Sociology of Religion - in sociology, there are broadly two approaches to the
definition of religion. The first, following Durkheim, defines religion in terms
of its social functions: religion is a system of beliefs and rituals with
reference to the sacred which binds people together into social groups. In
this sense, some sociologists have extended. tha notion of religion to include
nationalism. This recent perspective is criticized for being too inclusive,
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since almost any public activity - football, for example - may have
integrative effects for social groups. The second approach, following Weber,
defines religion as any set of coherent answers to human existential
dilemmas - birth, sickness 01· death - which make the world meaningful. In
this sense, religion is the human response to those things which concern us
ultimately. The implication of this definition is that all human beings are
religious, since we are all faced by the existential problems of disease, aging
and death. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988, p. 207). Weber's definition
of religion is similar to that of Luckmann's, who equates religion with
symbolic self-transcendence. Thus everything genuinely human is ipso facto
religious. (Berger, 1967, pp.175 -177; Luckmann, 1967).

The synthesis of Durkheimian (society as objective reality) and Weberian
(society as subjective reality) view points achieved by Berger allows for a
balance between the sociological reification of objective social reality and
the idealism of subjective meanings. "Society is a dialectic phenomenon in
that it is a human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet
continuously acts back upon its producer." (Berger, 1967, p. 3).

Technology - "Technology, bureaucracy and pluralism, then, are the
dominant institutional features of modernity. .All, Berger maintains, have
distinct effects on human consciousness. Truer to the argument, each of
them has a corollary at the level of consciousness. Together they allow one

to speak of modem consciousness or, in turn, the symbolic universe of
modernity. True to Weberian form, Berger maintains that technological
production was initially carried in the West by industrial capitalism though
this economic structure is presently only one among other possibilities."
(Wutbnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 56).
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Theodicy - theodicies traditionally sought to provide an explanation
(religious legitimation) of how to live through anomic phenomena, and are
typically explained in terms of the nomos ('sacred canopy') established in
the society in question. Theodicies were often seen as solutions to individual
suffering (a solution to the problem of evil). Berger sets theodicies within the
broader context of making meaning. As such a contemporary theodicy
needs to include such factors as the interrelationship between self, others,
the world, and the transcendent so as to provide some basis for an
authentic and meaningful existence (confer Berger, 1967, pp. 53 - 80).

Verstehen - is usually translated as 'understanding.' This concept has
formed part of a critique of positivist or naturalist sociology. It is argued
that sociology should not analyze human action from 'the outside' by
copying the methods of the natural sciences. Instead, sociology should
recognize the meanings people give to their actions. (Abercrombie, Hill, and
Turner, 1988, p. 265). The term is used to denote understanding from
within, by means of empathy, intuition, or imagination, as opposed to

knowledge from without, by means of observation and calculation. The term
was employed in particular by Weber. (Bullock, Stallybrass, and Trombley,
1988, p. 894).

World-taken-for-granted - is derived from Schutz (Collected Papers, Vol. I,
p. 207 ff.). This is the socially objectivated world which is the commonsense
world of everyday life. (Berger and Luclanann, 1966. p. 16).
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